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                 IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
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                    FOR THE DISTRICT OF DELAWARE
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    AMO DEVELOPMENT, LLC,
    AMO MANUFACTURING USA,
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    LLC, and AMO SALES AND
    SERVICE, INC.,
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              Plaintiffs,
                              C.A. No. 20-842-CFC
6
      v.
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    ALCON VISION, LLC, ALCON )
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    LABORATORIES, INC., and
    ALCON RESEARCH, LLC,
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              Defendants.
                            )
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13
                     Wednesday, January 18, 2023
                              3:00 p.m.
                        Pretrial Conference
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16
                           844 King Street
                        Wilmington, Delaware
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      BEFORE: THE HONORABLE COLM F. CONNOLLY
      United States District Court Judge
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      APPEARANCES:
22
                 MORRIS NICHOLS ARSHT & TUNNELL
23
                 BY:
                      JACK B. BLUMENFELD, ESQ.
                 BY: ANTHONY RAUCCI, ESQ.
24
                 -and-
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1	APPEARANCES	CONTINUED:	
2			
3			AM & WATKINS MICHAEL A. MORIN, ESQ.
4		BY:	RACHEL RENEE BLITZER, ESQ. SARANG V. DAMLE, ESQ.
5		BY:	TONY SAMMI, ESQ. ROGER CHIN, ESQ.
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10			KELLER KAREN KELLER, ESQ.
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12			-and-
13			LAND & ELLIS JEANNE M. HEFFERNAN, ESQ.
14		BY:	GREGG F. LOCASCIO, ESQ. NOAH S. FRANK, ESQ.
15			JOSHUA SIMMONS, ESQ. ELIZABETH HEDGES, ESQ.
16		BY:	JAMES LOMEO, ESQ.
17			Counsel for the Defendants
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PROCEEDINGS

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(Proceedings commenced in the courtroom beginning at 3:00 p.m.)

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THE COURT: All right. Mr. Blumenfeld.

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MR. BLUMENFELD: Thank you, Your Honor.

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with me at counsel table from Latham & Watkins,

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Mike Morin, Tony Sammi, Roger Chin, Sy Damle; behind them,

Jack Bloomfeld for Morris Nichols for the plaintiffs, and

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Carolyn Homer, Rachael Blitzer, Rachel Cohen; and in the

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first row, Denise DeFranco, who is in-house at

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Johnson & Johnson; and behind her, Anthony Raucci, who is

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Thank you, Your Honor.

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THE COURT: Ms. Keller, haven't seen in you a

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MS. KELLER: Yes. Good afternoon, Your Honor.

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Mr. Shaw sends his regards. He's on vacation, so I'm here

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With me today on behalf of Alcon from Kirkland

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& Ellis is Gregg LoCascio, Jeanne Heffernan, Noah Frank,

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and Joshua Simmons, and also Elizabeth Hedges and James

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Lomeo; in the back from Alcon, we have Jeff Prokop and

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Brannon Latimer.

at Morris Nichols.

while.

today.

1 THE COURT: All right, great. Thank you. All right. We have a lot to accomplish, and I 2 3 don't even think we're going to come close to 4 accomplishing it in two hours. So I'm thinking of 5 bringing you all back February 6, Monday afternoon. Is 6 that workable? 7 I mean, we're going to get through everything 8 we can today, but... 9 MR. LOCASCIO: It is on our camp. 10 MR. MORIN: Of course, Your Honor. THE COURT: Okay. 11 That works. Great. let's do that. 12 13 You also -- the case manager reminds me that we need to address, before we leave today, jury selection 14 15 dates, whether it's going to be a Friday or Monday. 16 Let me go ahead and say, you need to all submit 17 a glossary to the court reporter a week before the trial 18 date. And please remind me just to formally adopt the 19 pretrial order as modified by our rulings today. 20 So a very interesting case in so many regards. 21 And, you know, I do appreciate the lawyering in this case. 22 Got to see a lot of it. 23 I'm trying to figure out, like, how best to 24 resolve, kind of, the many motions out there and what are

some, maybe, threshold issues that we ought to grapple

with. One, for instance, that occurs to me is, I think, maybe, whether or not JJSV is a beneficial owner of the copyrighted — of the asserted copyrights might dictate the outcome of a number of issues pending before me. And maybe that's a place to start.

What do you all think?

Are there any other issues like that, for instance, that you say, oh, that would be a real -- I hate the word "impactful," but I'll just say -- or consequential decision?

MR. MORIN: Sure. Your Honor, I think the JJSV one makes sense. My partner, Roger Chin, will be addressing that issue. We're going to have a cast of characters today, if that's okay with Your Honor.

THE COURT: Yeah, that's fine.

MR. MORIN: One other issue that may cut across multiple motions is, Your Honor granted statute of limitations. And as you probably saw in some of the papers — and I would be happy to explain more — we think, unfortunately for us, that moots the issue of the alleged delay in bringing the lawsuit — and I can explain that more — which cuts across multiple motions as well.

But I'd be happy to explain that later, as well, whenever you'd like.

THE COURT: Well, you can. I mean, I will tell

you, you know, I'm going to be very surprised if you persuade me of that. You know, I think what comes out of Petrella are three rules, for sure. And they're stated right at the outset of Justice Ginsburg's opinion.

And one of the rules, the third rule, is that delay can also always -- and I think the word "always" is used by Justice Ginsburg -- be relevant to assessing the profits of the infringer. And I don't know how you're going to escape that.

The second rule right before it is that in extraordinary circumstances, it may be the case that laches could be considered. And, but anyway, I just think that third rule, I don't know how you're ever going to overcome that.

Now, how that plays out, whether it's in front of a jury, whether it's not, I think those are potentially issues, so.

But do you have any other, though, suggestions?

I mean, you know, we can tackle that issue too. I mean, I will be -- like the JJSV is one that, right away, I think it makes sense to tackle.

MR. LOCASCIO: I agree on the JJSV issue.

Mr. Frank is going to handle that on our side.

I think you raise a point there, we would raise, obviously, in response on the delay issue in

Petrella. There's other reasons, we think, it's also relevant.

There's a piece, though, that you touched on that I think is a threshold issue too, and that's the place for disgorgement and who decides it. And under the law, we think it's an issue for Your Honor to decide; they've raised should it be an advisory verdict. At which point, you'd still decide the findings at the end would go to the jury.

I think that question impacts jury instructions, how we plan to try the case and a lot of things. So put that on the list.

THE COURT: So I agree with you, that's a big one. I'm wondering though, if I decide that JJSV is not -- doesn't have standing because it's not a beneficial owner, I don't know, does that -- how that affects disgorgement. It seems to me it would, maybe -- somebody is shaking their head it won't. Okay.

So I thought it might, at least the scope of what you want to present, would be affected.

MR. LOCASCIO: I think it would have an impact, but at some point we can -- I think we've got a slide to sort of layout the various damages, sort of, three-headed beast over here on the other side, because there's -- the JJSV statute -- or motion for summary judgment two

question goes to actual damages of, has someone been injured and can they make a claim for actual damages, because you have to be a party with an ownership interest to do so.

Mr. Frank can speak way more intelligently to this issue than I can.

But the disgorgement side of the house, because there's, sort of, some versions where they have a combination, may be a royal plus disgorgement, maybe just disgorgement, that piece, we think, is an issue for Your Honor.

And so there's some interplay here because it's a little bit like a Venn diagram of profits plus disgorgement under one of their theories; straight disgorgement under another, royalty plus disgorgement.

THE COURT: Okay. Well, actually on that, yeah, one thing I want to do early on, but I think maybe we'll do it after we tackle JJSV is, I would like you to just tell me in very simple terms: What are your damages, you know?

It seems like it's -- I was thinking kind of a three-headed monster of actual damages, lost profits, or, you know, unjust enrichment/accounting/disgorgement. And then -- do you have a reasonable royalty too?

MR. MORIN: We do, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. So it is those three things?

MR. MORIN: Those are the three buckets,

Your Honor.

THE COURT: Okay. All right.

MR. MORIN: The latter two, lost profits and royalty, are both under actual damages, and then disgorgement is the other bucket.

And I thought, for the sake of making sure
we -- you know, we have agreement, the JJSV decision is a
consequential decision, but we agree that it's not a
disgorgement issue. It's an actual damages issue because
it goes to who can collect their harms.

And the disgorgement is, of course, on the Alcon side of the house; do they have to give up profits that they've made.

So they're -- I think we're in agreement that JJSV would affect actual damages, but not disgorgement when it comes to the calculation of the result.

THE COURT: Well, let's see, okay. I mean, I'm glad, maybe, you're in agreement. I would have thought there's something in the case law that does — there's language in the some of the cases that suggest that the defendants' profits, at times, are used as a proxy for actual damages, and in which case I thought maybe it would come up.

But, frankly, I think the case law is all over the place, and let's put this aside, but...

MR. MORIN: Well, may I offer one other thing?

And then I'll sit down and let Mr. Chin pick up the JJSV issue -- or maybe it's their motion, it depends on which -- whether we're dealing with the motion to realign or whether we're dealing with our motion.

But let me say one other thing only as a preview, but to plant something in your -- in Your Honor's mind, if you don't mind.

THE COURT: Sure.

MR. MORIN: So there is a -- there are cases going -- I will admit, there are cases going either way on whether the issue of disgorgement is for the judge or the jury. Judge Payne in the Huffman case takes into account the trial and says it goes to the jury. The Fair Isaac case is their lead case -- it's a Minnesota case. It says it goes to the judge.

So there are cases that go either way. I'll agree with my friend on that aspect of things.

We believe firmly it's a jury issue. But let me just plant one bug in your ear, Your Honor, is, even the Fair Isaac's case -- and I can pass it up -- that's their lead case, if you're familiar with that case, Your Honor.

1 THE COURT: It's not ringing a bell. Who 2 decided it? 3 MR. MORIN: It's a Minnesota magistrate judge 4 who decided that --5 THE COURT: I'll listen to you. I don't put a 6 lot of stake in non-Appellate Court opinions. But go 7 ahead anyway. You think -- is that your lead case? 8 9 MR. LOCASCIO: Our lead case is Petrella. THE COURT: Yeah, I was going to say, so... 10 11 MR. LOCASCIO: And then, if you look at -there's a Federal Circuit case, TAOS. 12 And then the District of Minnesota and the 13 District of Kansas that are -- sort of, come later in 14 15 time, and all treated as it's equitable, to start with. 16 No dispute it's disgorgement. It's not a proxy. And it's 17 not a proxy in this case. 18 And in the wake of that -- it's an issue for 19 the Court -- and this -- and where I think Mr. Morin is 20 going is, Courts will sometimes say, I'm still going to 21 leave it as an advisory verdict. 22 And indeed, the Fair Isaac case said, listen, 23 because this is kind of an uncharted issue. I think 24 Petrella decides it, but there's no case specifically 25 saying this point. The judge in Fair Isaac said, I think

it's not a jury issue but advisory verdict. 1 2 THE COURT: Okay. MR. MORIN: And the point I was getting to --3 4 we're starting to preview the arguments, and my friend is 5 very good at it --6 THE COURT: Well, you started it, so you can't 7 blame him. You started it. 8 MR. MORIN: I am not complaining, Your Honor. 9 He is doing the right thing, adjoining argument with me, 10 Your Honor. 11 THE COURT: Yeah. MR. MORIN: But, Your Honor, the point I was 12 13 getting to is, like I said, even the cases -- the few cases that have gone the other way, the Fair Isaac's case, 14 he says, I don't know what the Eighth Circuit is going to 15 16 do, because it's so muddled, so I'm going to set it for an 17 advisory verdict. 18 There's another case that we cite, Your Honor, 19 the Sysco case out of the Judge Freeman, out of the 20 Northern District of California. 21 And I know that we're not putting stock in what 22 the decision is, but he says, I don't have to --23 THE COURT: I think it's a "she." I think 24 Judge Freeman is a --25 MR. MORIN: She. She, I'm sorry. She, she.

1 was thinking there was another decision from Judge Alsup in the Northern District of California that --2 THE COURT: That's a "he." 3 MR. MORIN: -- does the same thing. 4 5 She says, Judge Freeman says, "I don't have to 6 decide this now. I'll send it to the jury, and it will 7 either be advisory or conclusive." 8 So I guess what I'm saying to Your Honor is, if 9 it's going advisory anyway -- which no case has said, 10 don't at least go advisory -- you can send it to the jury, 11 and we can sort it out later on, and decide later on, even in post-trial briefs, whether it has the effect of an 12 13 advisory jury or whether it's the binding decision. In other words, you don't actually have to 14 15 decide the issue now. I'm prepared to try to persuade you 16 that we're right. But you don't actually have to decide 17 the issue now. If you're at the very least going to do an 18 19 advisory jury, send it to the jury, and we can sort it out 20 afterwards, which is what Sysco did. 21 THE COURT: Okay. We'll talk about it. 22 MR. MORIN: Yeah. 23 THE COURT: But have your people look. 24 There's, I think, Federal Circuit case out there that 25 talks about how it's -- it can be error to put in front of

a jury a massive number and then have a decision made.

But anyway, we'll leave that for oral argument. No more on that.

MR. MORIN: Yeah, okay.

THE COURT: Okay. So let's just do this. All I want to hear -- and, really, in a way, the burden is on you. And by this I mean, you've got to establish standing.

So why don't you go first and tell me why JJSV either should be a party, and if not a party, whether its lost profits are fairly incorporated in the damages award.

MR. CHIN: Sure. Thank you, Your Honor. Roger Chin for plaintiffs.

Procedural question, there's both the motion to amend, which has the procedural aspects, as well as the substantive. I'd be happy to jump into either.

THE COURT: All I want to know is: Why is JJSV properly considered either as a party or -- and I think it's effectively the same question -- why, if it's not a party, should its lost profits, Catalys sales, in terms of Catalys sales or IOL sales, why should they be considered as part of the damages?

Do you agree that both -- that for them to either be a party or for their lost profits to be included in a damages award, they must be a beneficial owner of the

1 asserted copyrights? Do you agree with that? MR. CHIN: I think that there are two 2 3 independent pathways for damages to be recovered. 4 this is lost profits damages for that portion of lost 5 profits that goes to JJSV. There are two pathways. 6 Number 1 --7 THE COURT: So can you answer the question? 8 MR. CHIN: It does not have to be a beneficial 9 owner. 10 THE COURT: Okay. So it does not have to be. Okay. 11 That's one of two alternatives. 12 MR. CHIN: 13 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 14 MR. CHIN: So the two alternatives are, 15 Number 1, JJSV has assigned its legal title to AMO 16 Development. And with that assignment, it also assigned 17 rights for its claims, that it is assigned its claims for 18 damages to AMO Development. 19 So AMO Development, under black-letter law, 20 stands in the shoes --21 THE COURT: I don't know how you possibly -- I 22 don't even know how you make that argument with a straight 23 face. 24 The agreement says they gave up all legal 25 rights as of April 2, 2007. You don't get to give up all

your legal rights and then retain claims that you then 1 possess after April 2 in 2007. They've given up 2 3 everything as of April 2, 2007. 4 So I don't understand that at all. So do your 5 best to explain it. It's not in your brief, incidentally. 6 It's in no briefing, as far as I can tell. 7 MR. CHIN: Yes. So I think it's -- it would be 8 helpful to turn to the transfer agreement itself, which 9 both parties had identified. 10 That's Exhibit 27. 11 **THE COURT:** Exhibit 27 to what? 12 MR. CHIN: Good question. Docket 427, I 13 believe that's Exhibit 27 to... 14 THE COURT: All right. I got it. I'm looking 15 at it. 16 MR. CHIN: So it's pretty short, and I think 17 the first page answers the question. 18 The transfer agreement was dated August 21, 19 2020, and effective April of 2007. The transfer provision 20 in -- and it's clear that as of August 21, 2020, we 21 believe that JJSV had a claim for damages that it was able 22 to transfer to another party that stands in its shoes. 23 Now, let's take a look at the agreement itself. 24 Paragraph 2, towards the bottom of the page, 25 the transfer says that JJSV transfers the rights to AMO

Development from and after the effective date of all rights, all passed claims for damages, et cetera. So -
THE COURT: Time out.

I'm going to stop you right away because I looked at the transcript. I had to reflect on what you said.

MR. CHIN: Sure.

THE COURT: You said, the transfer provision, it's clear, that as of August 21, 2020, we believe that JJSV had a claim for damages.

Okay. Stop you right there.

And if the effective date of the transfer agreement was August 21, 2020, different world; but the agreement provides that the effective date of the transfer is April 2, 2007.

So it doesn't matter what claims have arisen after April 2, 2007. This transfer occurred effective April 2, 2007.

Now, mind you, my sense is, from talking with my clerks that there's actually cases that say you can't retroactively assign a copyright — but neither of you have raised that argument, and it's waived if you tried to raise it now, and I don't know how it would necessarily help you — but you picked the effective date.

So it doesn't matter, as far as I can tell,

that as of August 21, 2020, you had some legal claim, 1 because this agreement says it's effective April 2, 2007. 2 3 MR. CHIN: What I think is important is the 4 intent on the parties. Obviously, it's the intent of JJSV 5 and AMO Development, as captured in Exhibit 27, the 6 transfer agreement. 7 And the intent of the agreement, I think, is quite clearly stated in Paragraph 2 when it states that it 8 9 transfers the rights from and after the effective date. 10 Now, we are into a rather odd metaphysical question of, can you -- you know, you say it's 11 retroactive, but it was done in August of 2020. 12 13 THE COURT: I know, but you decided to phrase 14 it this way. And by the way, you did it after litigation 15 started. 16 So you think you're allowed to play fast and 17 loose and say "from and after the effective date"? 18 mean... 19 MR. CHIN: The transfer is a decision by the 20 Obviously, the intent of the parties controls. 21 THE COURT: No. Well, okay. Well, the language controls. I mean, it's -- this is under what 22 23 law? Laws of Delaware. 24 So we don't go beyond the four corners of the

agreement under Delaware contract law. If it's clear on

It says effect date is April 2, 2007. 1 its face. MR. CHIN: As I said, it's effective then. But 2 it was effective to transfer rights from and after the 3 4 effective date. 5 THE COURT: So, okay. 6 MR. CHIN: Now, just to be clear in terms of 7 the timeline, JJSV, as stated in our papers, acquired a 8 legal ownership right through authorship of its employee, Mr. Duff. 9 10 And for purposes of these motions, I don't 11 think that's disputed. May be a factual dispute, but it 12 hasn't been contested --13 THE COURT: And when did that occur? When did his actions occur? 14 15 MR. CHIN: That was, I believe, between 2000 --16 after 2007. 17 THE COURT: Right. But you've already given up 18 your right as of April 2, 2007. 19 MR. CHIN: Well, to the extent that one reads 20 this as giving up rights prior to April 2, 2007, any 21 subsequently acquired rights, if one were to read it that 22 way, would then exist after the fact, and that would still 23 be with JJSV. That is --24 THE COURT: Under your reading of this 25 contract -- I mean, think about it now, just like a

hypothetical, it's like I could -- I could assign a patent to somebody and I could say, "I'm giving you all the rights effective January 1, 10 years ago. Oh, but by the way, I'm keeping all my rights after and before that date."

I mean, at that point, now we're both -- we both just have the rights to everything. I mean, it seems absurd.

MR. CHIN: So what was transferred -- what would be transferred as of April 2007? The only thing that would be transferred as of April 2007 are rights that JJSV had as of April 2007.

If JJSV acquired additional rights after

April 2007, that would have to be a separate transfer. If
they didn't exist, they wouldn't have been transferred as
of April 2007. They would have been transferred as of
August 2020, when the parties agreed from and after the
effective date to transfer copyrights, as well as claims
for damages.

THE COURT: I mean, JJSV irrevocably sells, transfers, conveys, assigns and delivers to AMO

Development from -- and I agree it says "and after the effective date" and in perpetuity.

It's already done it. As of April 2, 2007, it's transferred everything. There's nothing else to

It transferred everything. 1 reclaim. It says, "Any and all of its rights, titles and 2 3 interests to and under the copyright." It's gone. You know, you picked April 2, 2007. 4 5 I don't know why you picked it. You gave it all up. 6 MR. CHIN: Well, to the extent that -- so let's 7 talk about Mr. Duff's work in the 2007 to 2010 --8 THE COURT: You've already given up. Anything 9 that happens after April 2, 2007, you've given up under 10 the terms of your contract. 11 MR. CHIN: And if it has been given up and transferred to AMO Development, then AMO Development 12 stands in the shoes of the rights that JJSV would have to 13 14 make those claims. 15 THE COURT: No. AMO Development took whatever 16 existed as of April 2, 2007. You're out of the picture, "you" JJSV. And now AMO Development is the party that, if 17 18 a claim arises, it's the legal copyright titleholder. 19 By the way, that's what you allege in the 20 complaint, right? You say it has the rights. 21 MR. CHIN: That is correct. We believe that 22 AMO Development today, and as of August 2020, has the 23 legal ownership rights. 24 (Cross-talking.) 25 THE COURT: All right. I'm not persuaded by

anything you say, so let's just do this.

MR. CHIN: Okay.

THE COURT: And I think it's funny you spent barely any time in your briefing defending or taking on this position that you've articulated here.

So what you do argue in your briefing is you're a beneficial owner.

MR. CHIN: That's right.

THE COURT: All right. So now, why don't you at least address that argument.

MR. CHIN: Okay. So the legislative history of the Copyright Act, of course, gives the one example, which both sides have identified from case law, of the beneficial owner being a former — being an author and former legal titleholder who transfers rights in exchange for royalty.

The legislative history and the case law that cites that indicates that it includes, but is not necessarily limited to that situation.

So what do we have here? We have an entity that was an author via Mr. Duff, and therefore a legal title owner by virtue of being an author, that has transferred rights to another entity, AMO Development.

The former legal titleholder also shares economic interests because it is involved in development,

marketing and sales of products covered by the copyright. 1 So we have a situation where -- and I should 2 add one more fact, and that is that --3 4 THE COURT: Why is it relevant that you had 5 Duff do work? Why is that relevant? 6 MR. CHIN: Duff was the contributor to the 7 copyrighted software, so -- and he was an employee of 8 JJSV. So that makes JJSV having owner -- legal ownership 9 interest at the time that he does --10 THE COURT: That's where the transfer agreement 11 kills you. You gave that up April 2, 2007. So is there any other reason it would be relevant? 12 13 MR. CHIN: Well, he's an author as well. of course, under the Copyright Act, authors have -- have a 14 15 special status. That is, in fact, why the legislative 16 history identifies authors who transferred economic 17 interest -- transfer the title, and who retain an economic 18 interest to have beneficial ownership. 19 So we are in a situation, putting aside the 20 timing of the transfer. We have an entity that is an 21 author, at least a coauthor, of the copyrighted software 22 via Mr. Duff. JJSV is the author. 23 It is transferred -- either as of April of 2007

or August of 2020, it's transferred the copyright to the

legal title owner. And the legal title owner owes a

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fiduciary duty to JJSV. JJSV remains involved. And, of 1 course, JJSV is an author via Mr. Duff. 2 3 Now, those circumstances line up quite closely 4 with both the SBK case and the Peter Pan case, identifying 5 who constitutes a beneficial owner. 6 **THE COURT:** How do they line up? 7 SBK, you're talking has -- it talks about 8 royalty fee and a license. Do you have that here? 9 MR. CHIN: Yes. So in the SBK --10 THE COURT: You do? JJSV has --11 MR. CHIN: I'm sorry. No, I --12 **THE COURT:** JJSV has a loyalty? 13 MR. CHIN: Oh, I thought you said did I have the SBK case in mind. I'm sorry. 14 15 (Court reporter clarification.) 16 MR. CHIN: So, yes. 17 THE COURT: You said SBK lines up nicely here. 18 And so my question is: Is there a royalty or license in 19 the SBK case? 20 MR. CHIN: It is a royalty case. 21 THE COURT: Right. So do we have that here? 22 Do we have a royalty or a license? 23 MR. CHIN: As I mentioned, the legislative 24 history -- which SBK is following -- identifies that one 25 exemplary case. But SBK explains that the beneficial

owner is one that retains an economic interest from proceeds derived from the exploitation of the copyright.

So while the particular example in SBK is a retained royalty, it describes the retained royalty and the significance of it as a retained economic interest in the proceeds derived from the exploitation of the copyright.

And that's what -- that's how it lines up with the current situation, where JJSV, likewise, has an economic interest in the proceeds derived from exploitation of the copyright through its joint -- through its involvement in development, marketing and so forth.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHIN: Now, the other case, Peter Pan, it's an old case, but it identifies what is called an equitable interest, which the 1976 Act had codified into the words of "beneficial owner."

So Peter Pan is essentially describing the equitable basis for the codification of beneficial owner.

And in Peter Pan, the situation was a subsidiary and a parent. The subsidiary was a legal title owner of the copyright. And the parent had an equitable interest because it was the parent who was owed a fiduciary duty by the subsidiary, and it was, likewise, involved in development, marketing and manufacturing of

the copyrighted products. That is to say, it, likewise, retained an economic interest in proceeds derived from exploitation of the copyright.

So Peter Pan, arguably is, on the facts themselves, even closer than SBK because the parent company, Glass, was joined as a co-plaintiff and beneficial -- or equitable owner, who's the -- that was the language at the time -- because it was the parent and it shared the economic interest.

Now, I think it's also important to distinguish the cases that are identified by Alcon. In the *John Wiley* case, for example -- they identified, I believe, three cases: *John Wiley*, *HyperQuest* and *Cortner*.

John Wiley was a bare assignment of the right to sue to an agent. That's clearly not what we have.

HyperQuest was simply a nonexclusive licensee.

And *Cortner* was another royalty case where they were found to be a beneficial owner.

So it's true that neither sides' cases have the exact facts at issue here. But the rationale of *SBK* and of *Peter Pan* identified the situation where you have a prior legal owner who has a fiduciary interest, via subsidiary, and is involved in the economics of the copyrights. And those are the factors that create an equitable interest under *Peter Pan*, and a beneficial

ownership under SBK.

Now, two points I'd like to flag here.

John Wiley, when it -- that's the case about the photography agent who had the bare right to sue -- it actually distinguishes the situation of an author when it says -- in that case, the agent -- neither has, nor has ever had, an exclusive right under the copyright.

And here we have a situation where we do have the author who has an interest in the copyrights, much like the legislative history case of the author who claims royalty.

THE COURT: So I'd agree with you except you gave it up.

Let me ask you: Why did you make the transfer agreement effective April 2, 2007?

MR. CHIN: I actually don't know the answer to that, but that covers the entire time range of interest.

So beginning April 2, 2007 through August, was the time period in which all the work was done, and all the work was transferred from and after that date.

THE COURT: Why did your client enter that agreement after this litigation began? Why didn't it enter before litigation began?

MR. CHIN: Once again, I apologize, I don't know the answer to that in terms of the motivation for

entering into it. 1 But I should say this, that is, it is clear 2 3 that provides -- that we believe that that provides AMO 4 Development full legal title to seek all these -- seek the 5 claims, being a legal owner. 6 So it was a transfer to ensure that AMO 7 Development had full legal title to assert the claims. 8 THE COURT: And I think it is undisputed, it 9 does have full legal title; is that right? 10 MR. FRANK: For purposes of this motion, yes. 11 MR. LOCASCIO: I'd even go beyond it's not just 12 for purposes of the motion, Your Honor. 13 It's a question of, that's great, but they can't seek lost profits for things they don't sell. 14 15 THE COURT: Right. So it's undisputed, they 16 are the -- they hold the legal title to the patent. And 17 that's consistent to what you allege in your second 18 amended complaint. 19 That's right. That's right. MR. CHIN: So --20 and --21 THE COURT: Let me just ask you this: 22 exclusive right of the asserted copyrights does JJSV have 23 a beneficial ownership in? 24 MR. CHIN: Sure. 25 It is the exclusive right that AMO Development

has the fiduciary to JJSV and co-marketer, and so forth, 1 has in the copyright, in that AMO Development is able to 2 3 exclude everyone else. 4 And let me actually point out a particular --5 THE COURT: No, wait. Wait, wait, wait. Time 6 out. 7 I thought by definition the beneficial owner 8 doesn't have the right to exclude. 9 MR. CHIN: The --THE COURT: That's the legal -- that's where 10 11 the legal titleholder has to come in, right? MR. CHIN: The exclusive right --12 13 THE COURT: They have to have an economic 14 interest. I'm not sure that's really the right language, 15 but I'll give it to you. 16 They have to have an ownership in the exclusive 17 right, which is held by the legal titleholder, right? 18 MR. CHIN: They have to have an economic 19 interest and beneficial ownership of the exclusive right 20 held by the legal titleholder. 21 THE COURT: Right. But the key -- what I want 22 you to focus on is its ownership interest in the exclusive 23 right. 24 It's not in the legal titleholder. It's in the 25 exclusive right held by the legal titleholder.

That's right. And it's --1 MR. CHIN: THE COURT: So tell me specifically -- like, 2 3 the fiduciary duty, that applies to ownership. That's 4 their -- they're an owner, so they've got fiduciary 5 duties. 6 I assume that's what you are getting at, right? 7 MR. CHIN: AMO Development has fiduciary duty 8 It derives from the whole notion of trust to JJSV. 9 principles in which beneficial ownership arose in the 10 first place. 11 THE COURT: Okay. I thought you were --12 ownership of the company. 13 So where is the -- you're going to have to really explain to me then; where's the beneficial 14 15 ownership in the, quote, "exclusive right"? 16 MR. CHIN: Got it. 17 So I think that that's actually answered by the 18 Wiley case. The Wiley case actually identifies where the 19 exclusive right is, and it says that the beneficial 20 owner -- the equitable interest derives value from another 21 person's use of an exclusive right. 22 So that's the purpose of an equitable interest, 23 and that's the purpose of a beneficial owner. 24 THE COURT: No. So actually what it says is,

"The interest must be one that derives its value directly

from another person's use of an exclusive right." 1 So where is that here? What is JJSV's 2 3 derivation of value directly from a person's use? I.e., a 4 license, right? That's really what it is, right? 5 Another person's use of the copyright, the 6 value, that's embodied in a license, right? 7 MR. CHIN: I believe in the John Wiley 8 situation, as well as in the classic situation of an 9 equitable interest, the exclusive use of the copyright is essentially the legal title owner's interest in the 10 11 copyright and its exclusivity. 12 That is, the legal titleholder, AMO 13 Development, holds exclusive rights, and the beneficial owner's interest is derivative of the legal titleholders' 14 15 exclusive rights. 16 THE COURT: Okay. So you want to characterize 17 it that way, I'm good with that. 18 Where does it directly flow from the exclusive 19 Where is that here? right? 20 MR. CHIN: Yeah. I mean, that flows from the 21 fact that -- as I mentioned, we have the four prongs that 22 I had identified. Namely, it is involved in the 23 commercialization, marketing, et cetera, of the 24 copyrighted products together with AMO Development. 25 THE COURT: But it's involved in the marketing

of all AMO Development's products. Where is it tied directly to the exclusive use of the asserted copyrights?

MR. CHIN: So the legal titleholder, AMO

Development, holds -- as we've all agreed today, holds the entirety of the legal title of the copyright. It is the exclusive plus --

THE COURT: Right.

MR. CHIN: -- owner of the copyrights.

JJSV is involved, not only as a prior author and original legal titleholder, but -- and -- but it also has an economic interest in the products that are covered by the copyright, like IFS products, via its joint market -- involvement in marketing and so forth.

And AMO Development holds -- has a fiduciary responsibility to JJSV to maximize that value in the exclusive rights that AMO Development holds.

So AMO Development has the exclusive rights, and JJSV, by virtue of being a beneficial owner through its economic involvement, as well as through its — through the fiduciary duty that AMO Development owes to JJSV, JJSV then has a direct interest in those same exclusive rights that are held by the legal titleholder, AMO Development.

THE COURT: Okay. Anything else?

MR. CHIN: I'd like to point out one more

1 point. And that is, an argument was made by Alcon that the assignment, itself, somehow neutralizes the beneficial 2 3 rights. 4 And I think the case law in SBK, in particular, 5 teaches us assignment of legal rights is not a forfeiture 6 of beneficial rights. 7 THE COURT: I agree. I agree with that. I'm not sure they're making that argument. 8 Ιf 9 they are, we'll hear it. 10 But I would agree with you that -- I mean, SBK 11 spells out the paradigm situation is, you give up the legal title, but you get a license. And that's where 12 13 you're getting something that is an economic interest that is directly tied to the use of the exclusive right. That 14 15 makes sense to me. 16 MR. CHIN: And I quess --17 THE COURT: Can you tell me any case that found a beneficial right of copyright in a fiduciary duty? 18 19 MR. CHIN: Based solely on a fiduciary duty? 20 THE COURT: Well, actually where it even 21 discusses fiduciary duty. 22 MR. CHIN: It does not occur to me now. We can 23 identify that for you in correspondence. I believe it may 24 be in one of the cases.

But I can perhaps say this, and that is, there

is no case on either side that addresses this particular circumstance.

We believe that SBK comes the closest to describing the circumstances beyond this one example. We know from the legislative history that the legislative history gave the one example; a former author and owner who receives a royalty. It's not an exclusive example, but it's the example that shows up all over the case law.

THE COURT: Can you cite any other example besides that where the legal title has assigned legal ownership, but retains an economic interest in the form of a license or royalty payment?

Can you cite any other case where something other than those two circumstances accounted for justified beneficial ownership?

MR. CHIN: I don't think there's a case that discusses that one way or the other. If there were a patent case, there would be a Federal Circuit case, I'm sure.

But unfortunately, in the copyright context, there has not been a case, sofar as I'm aware, that has discussed that example one way or the other.

So we have to rely on the teachings from SBK and other cases to figure out what is the closest analogy.

Because we know certainly from the legislative

history itself, it is not limited to that circumstance. 1 THE COURT: Well, why do we know that 2 3 certainly? I mean, does it use the word "example"? 4 MR. CHIN: It does, in fact. It says -- I 5 jotted it down somewhere, but I believe it says something to the effect of "including, but not limited to." 6 7 I can find that language. But --8 THE COURT: Right. If you want to find it, go 9 Why don't you find that while your colleague ahead. 10 talks. 11 My guess is, for example -- first of all, I think it's from House Report Number 94-1476, and it's 12 quoted in Wiley. And it describes a term "beneficial 13 14 owner" as, quote, "Including, for example, an author who 15 had parted with legal title to the copyright in exchange 16 for percentage royalties based on sales or license fees," 17 unquote. 18 MR. CHIN: Yes. I think you found the cite that I had in mind. "Including, for example" --19 20 THE COURT: Right. I think the example is it's 21 an author. That's, I think, the point. It's an author 22 that's retaining financial interest in the form of 23 royalties. But I don't think the example is the 24 royalties.

But anyway, let me hear from the other side.

And if you can, if you can come up with a case that cites anything other than a situation where the beneficial ownership is found to exist based on something other than royalties or license, you let me know.

MR. CHIN: Will do.

THE COURT: Thank you.

MR. FRANK: Thank you, Your Honor. Noah Frank on behalf of Alcon.

If there is a case like the one you were asking, it has not previously been cited. The only cases finding that there was a beneficial owner deal with in the scenario that you pointed out, author exchanges bare legal title in exchange for royalties. SBK is that case.

Also, the question of beneficial ownership was not actually in play. The question was: Can a beneficial owner be found to be an infringer? And so not on point in this scenario.

Peter Pan, the other case Mr. Chin cited, dealt with a case of misjoinder. It didn't actually raise the question of beneficial ownership.

What it said -- and 173 F. Supp 292 at 298, it said: "Weaner failed to utilize the opportunity to squarely raise the issue of misjoinder. Had the issue been raised directly, plaintiffs would then be in a position to present whatever facts it possessed to

delineate Glass' interest in the subject matter of this 1 2 litigation." 3 So that's the case they point to to say a 4 parent can have some sort of beneficial ownership 5 interest. 6 The case doesn't actually say it said that 7 issue is not in front of me. 8 THE COURT: Right. And, in fact, the quote I 9 have from that case is that joinder of a parent, quote, 10 "may represent justifiable action," unquote. 11 And that, quote, "trial evidence may show an 12 equitable ownership." 13 So it's -- and, of course, it is possible, right, because you could have a parent retain a beneficial 14 15 ownership in the form of a royalty payment, right? 16 And that would be tied directly to the exercise 17 of an exclusive right of a copyright, as opposed to just 18 some general ownership of the companies and their revenue 19 streams across the board. 20 MR. FRANK: That's correct. 21 THE COURT: Right. And that's what's missing 22 here. 23 MR. FRANK: That's absolutely correct. 24 look at the transfer agreement, which Your Honor spoke

about, there's no retention of rights.

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And, in fact, if there were a beneficial 1 2 ownership, that would be gone due to the transfer agreement because it doesn't retain any sort of beneficial 3 4 ownership of anything. 5 THE COURT: Why do you think they transferred 6 it effective April 2, 2007? 7 MR. FRANK: My assumption is that -- their 8 allegations of copying relate to the version of the source 9 code that was around that time frame. I think they just 10 wanted to predate any potential allegations of copying. 11 But I don't know. They could have structured it 12 differently, and they didn't. 13 THE COURT: Now, they suggest -- and I don't even remember what -- for some reason, I think it's 14 15 D.I.-490, which I can't remember what it is. 16 But they suggest that in that document, you 17 said something like, this transfer is not valid or it 18 doesn't count or -- that, you know -- is there any -- do 19 you have any recollection of them making that assertion 20 about you? 21 Did you ever take a position that the transfer 22 agreement's not valid or? 23 MR. FRANK: That's not ringing a bell,

THE COURT: Okay.

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Your Honor.

MR. FRANK: One other thing I wanted to point out. Mr. Chin cited to Cortner. Cortner, again, was the standard retention of a royalty case.

And this whole theory on this beneficial ownership really relates to this question of, well, JJSV must have been a legal owner, and therefore they retained something in the transfer agreement.

Well, the burden's on them to come forward with that. And by the terms of the agreement, it's clear — they wrote the agreement. And it's clear, they have no rights.

And I'd also point Your Honor to their answering brief at Page 7. And they say that -- and they agree -- the mere existence of a parent subsidiary relationship does not itself confer a parent company with beneficial ownership.

They, then, go on to say that that's not what we're doing here. Rather, it is a beneficial -- it,

JJSV -- is a beneficial owner in its own right because it retains an economic interest in the copyrights derived from the profits it receives from its exploitation.

But that could be said about any parent subsidiary relationship. There's nothing in the record that they point to where they receive something in return for giving up a right. And so there is no beneficial

ownership in this case. And it's JJSV's burden to prove it. I'd also point out that Mr. Chin said what matters is the intent of the parties. And in their briefing, they make a lot of this Rick Duff point and say, well, we became a legal owner because of Rick Duff. Well, if you look at the transfer agreement in

Well, if you look at the transfer agreement in its Paragraph 123, the third line, it said, "The parties have always intended that any copyright interests in such computer programs used" -- I assume by the IFS systems -- "be held by AMO Development."

And then in the next "whereas" clause, it says, "JJSV, nevertheless, may have acquired copyright interests."

So they never claimed that they actually were a legal owner and had given up legal ownership.

They said, "We've never been a legal owner. We never meant to be a legal owner. And just in case that's not true, we're not a legal owner. JJSV is not in this case. AMO Development is the legal owner."

And I'm happy to answer any other questions you have on this issue, but...

THE COURT: No. So the statement I had in mind was this. It was a quote. This is in their reply brief,

1 that Alcon's position is that this transfer was ineffective. 2 I don't know why I thought D.I.-90. It's 3 D.I.-458 at three to four. I don't know what that is. 4 5 Do you know what they're referring to? 6 Have you asserted at some point in the 7 litigation that the transfer agreement was not effect --8 was ineffective? 9 MR. FRANK: I'm sorry, could you point me to 10 the page? This is their response brief to the summary 11 judgment? 12 THE COURT: D.I.-516 at Page 13. Or if you 13 have the hard copy of the reply brief, it's Page 9. It's in Footnote 4. 14 15 MR. FRANK: Is this the motion to amend? 16 THE COURT: Yes. Motion to realign. 17 MR. FRANK: I'm not entirely sure what the 18 reference is. We did say that it was ineffective to 19 confer any right to pass damages. But I don't know what 20 they're referring to. 21 MR. LOCASCIO: Or actually, just give me the 22 cite once more. I think I found the brief you're 23 referring to. 24 THE COURT: D.I.-458, and it's at Pages 3 to 25 4 -- well, first of all, what is that?

This is the -- it's J&J's reply 1 MR. FRANK: brief in support of their motion for leave to amend. 2 3 THE COURT: No, no, that's D.I.-516. 4 MR. FRANK: Sure. D.I.-4 --5 THE COURT: In Footnote 4, that J&J says, 6 quote, "Alcon's position is that this transfer was 7 ineffective, " unquote. 8 They're talking about the transfer agreement, 9 and they cite D.I.-458 at three to four. 10 MR. LOCASCIO: And the sentence that carries 11 the page -- I'm looking at it -- is, "as of the effective 12 date, JJSV possessed no rights or interests in any of the 13 transfer copyrights, and thus was not a copyright owner 14 accruing damages." 15 But that section is a page long, and it's AMO 16 Development and J&J, we are bound by the transfer 17 agreement, which says, "it's effective, but you gave 18 everything away, so you have no ability for damages." 19 That's what three to four says. 20 THE COURT: All right. So you've never alleged 21 that this agreement is ineffective? 22 MR. LOCASCIO: We have not. 23 THE COURT: Okay. 24 MR. LOCASCIO: And if we're speculating as to 25 why they did it, if I can pipe in on that one because I've

got a different version.

I think, if look at the timing, they clearly thought -- I assume they had some concern, does AMO Development have standing? Is there some vestige? Maybe this Duff, maybe somebody else. And they said, let's just get it all over there, so they can be a party, just like a patent case, going to shore up standing.

And then the benefit to them is: We're not going to be in this. No discovery from us, no JJSV hassle. Except, what somebody wasn't thinking about that day was, we're going to seek IOL revenues which are not sold and no profits come to any of the parties that are actually plaintiffs.

THE COURT: Okay. All right. Thank you.

All right, Mr. Chin.

MR. CHIN: Your Honor, perhaps I can come back
to the direct economic interest point.

It occurred to me that -- and we've identified one document that I failed to mention earlier, that does indicate how JJSV has a direct economic interest.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHIN: And I believe that is -- it's an interrogatory response. But for purposes of summary judgment, the Court should treat that as, at least creating a disputed fact, in that we identified the flow

1 of money. And I believe it is Exhibit 26. 2 3 THE COURT: Okay. 4 MR. CHIN: And in Exhibit 26 -- I apologize. I 5 was just handed this. I'm trying to find the cite as we 6 speak. 7 MR. MORIN: Eighteen, Page 18. 8 MR. CHIN: Oh, Page 18. Why don't I do this: 9 Why I don't I tell you what the point is, and then I'll 10 come back with the cite for you. 11 THE COURT: All right. 12 MR. CHIN: And the point is that, as we 13 identified in our interrogatory responses that the revenue 14 flows are owed to AMO Development, but are paid to JJSV. That is, JJSV ultimately enjoys the economic benefit of 15 16 the moneys that were owed to AMO Development. 17 And that's not surprising, because JJSV --18 because AMO Development has the fiduciary duty and 19 ultimately pays the money upstairs. It's part of 20 consolidated books. 21 THE COURT: By "fiduciary duty," you mean 22 because they're a subsidiary? 23 MR. CHIN: They are a subsidiary, yes. 24 THE COURT: And so you're saying they owe a 25 fiduciary duty to protect --

To manage IT responsibility. And, 1 MR. CHIN: in fact, due to the consolidated books of the company, the 2 3 money is, in fact, ultimately paid to JJSV. 4 And the passage, which I can't find the page 5 number for --6 THE COURT: Time out. They ultimately paid --7 it's ultimately paid it because it's an owner of the 8 company, AMO. 9 MR. CHIN: That's right. 10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. CHIN: Well, not only an owner, but also an 12 entity that directly participates in the marketing and 13 development of the products as well. THE COURT: Of all of their products. 14 15 MR. CHIN: All of their products, including the 16 copyright products, and all the products that are subject 17 to damages. 18 THE COURT: Okay. All right. Anything else? 19 MR. CHIN: So that's a direct economic 20 interest. 21 THE COURT: All right. 22 MR. CHIN: But coming back to the example of an 23 author that is paid a royalty. As I indicated, sofar as 24 we're aware, unless we can -- that there is no case that 25 goes directly on point to either in either direction.

But I would suggest that the Peter Pan case, 1 which talks about the equitable interest, which is a --2 3 the predecessor, shall we say, to the beneficial 4 ownership, talks about the equitable rights that flow from 5 being both a parent and --6 THE COURT: I don't agree with you. 7 So I think what that case talks about is that 8 it posits that there could be a situation where a parent 9 could constitute an equitable owner, but it is certainly 10 not by virtue of it being a parent. 11 And I think it's undisputed, the case law says 12 "mere ownership of the company"; i.e., the parent, 13 subsidiary relationship is, by itself, insufficient to establish beneficial ownership. 14 15 MR. CHIN: By itself, I agree. 16 THE COURT: Right. 17 MR. CHIN: But the Peter Pan situation also involved a parent who was involved in the development, 18 19 marketing, and manufacturing of the products as well. 20 THE COURT: All right. 21 MR. CHIN: So --22 THE COURT: So I'm going to make a ruling. I 23 do not believe that J&J has established that JJSV was a

beneficial owner of the asserted copyrights.

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And it transferred, effective April 2, 2007,

its legal ownership of the asserted copyrights. It did not retain a direct economic interest in the form of a license or royalty, and so it did not have a beneficial ownership interest in an exclusive right of the asserted copyrights.

And JJSV argues that, first, it wasn't the original legal owner of the copyright through the work of its employee, Mr. Duff. All that work occurred after April 2, 2007. And it transferred all of those efforts and the beneficial ownership, or legal ownership that would have followed from those efforts, as of April 2, 2007.

It did it retroactively. And both sides have agreed it was able to do that retroactively. And it was an effective agreement. No one is arguing that this was an invalid transfer.

The second thing that JJSV posits as a theory that would make it a beneficial owner is that it shares management, sales and marketing functions for the copyrighted products.

Well, it shares those functions generally with, certainly, the copyrighted products and other products.

And that is really just another way of summarizing some of the things it does for its subsidiary. And it is not tied directly to the exclusive rights of the asserted

copyrights. And it's not a royalty. It's not a license.

Third, J&J relies on this fiduciary duty that AMO owes to JJSV, but that's by virtue of its parent subsidiary relationship. It is not tied directly to the copyrights.

And so I don't think those facts would justify characterizing JJSV as a beneficial owner of these asserted copyrights. So therefore, it doesn't have standing.

And then maybe we should discuss what consequences flow from that.

I think one consequence that flows from that is that the plaintiffs will be unable to assert a claim to recover for damages associated with IOL sales and Catalys sales, except for the period in which AMO Development sold the Catalys machines. I think that's one consequence.

Is that right?

\$MR.\$ CHIN: That that would be the consequence if $\mbox{J\&J} \mbox{ --}$

THE COURT: I think. I don't -- I'm asking.

I'm looking for -- you know, the lawyers on both sides

here generally give ground when they have to. And so I

think that's a consequence, but it may not be.

What do you think?

MR. FRANK: I think that's uncontested at this

1 point. THE COURT: And that's what I would have 2 3 But do you want to, maybe, talk about that? thought. 4 MR. CHIN: If you could give us just one 5 minute? 6 THE COURT: Sure. 7 MR. MORIN: Your Honor, I'll need a little bit 8 of time to confer with my team on that. Maybe we step to 9 other things to be efficient with Your Honor's time. 10 THE COURT: That's fine. Because what I think 11 what I'm going to do here is -- I mean, I'm going to make 12 some rulings that I can, based on the arguments of the 13 lawyers, and then -- well, and see where it leads us as 14 far as the pending motions. 15 Okay. But that takes care of that one issue. 16 MR. MORIN: I'd just rather not do that on the 17 fly. Let me meet with the team, need to confer with the 18 team. 19 THE COURT: That sounds good. That's sounds 20 like a very good thing. 21 All right. So maybe, let's do this. Just give 22 me one second. 23 Oh, actually, just to add further -- although, 24 if I have to, I will write something. It's dependent on 25 where this case goes, because I could always memorialize

in writing, you know, some of my thinking on this issue.

But just to further, I think the SBK case does the best job of defining what a beneficial owner is. And I relied on that. I relied on the Wiley case as well.

And I relied on the legislative history because

"beneficial owner" is not defined in the express language of the statute.

And it's true, the beneficial -- or rather the house report does cite, as an example, an author who had legal ownership, assigned it away, but maintained an economic interest in the exclusive right of the legal ownership, which was in the form of royalties and license, fees obtained from sales and licenses, rather.

And then I also relied on the many cases that say a parent subsidiary relationship is insufficient to establish a beneficial ownership. All right.

Okay. We could do next, I guess -- do you want to talk about disgorgement next? Do you think that would be, kind of, what the -- let's think about what's most consequential.

I can also start -- we can start going through the other two summary judgment motions. We have two and three left, right?

MR. LOCASCIO: So that was two. I think you largely did -- with the question of, what's the impact? I

think you just addressed Alcon Motion 2.

THE COURT: Yeah. Let's move to three.

MR. LOCASCIO: And three, which is -- whether you think of this as Alcon Motion Summary Judgment 3 or Alcon MIL-3, which is disgorgement, which is where, maybe, the most briefing on this question, the legal question happens, I'll take that and -- it feeds through both of those. And I also think maybe even their MIL-4.

THE COURT: All right. Give me one second.

All right. What we can do on -- why don't we start with -- let's go with Summary Judgment Number 3.

MR. LOCASCIO: That's fine, Your Honor.

And the reason I, sort of, maybe blurred those together is, ultimately, the question of laches application, which is in Summary Judgment 3 -- part of the battle over that is, its role as an equitable defense.

And then the question is: Well, okay, is disgorgement in and of itself equitable? Which is the nature of that motion. But -- so I will take it as Summary Judgment motion 3.

And at base, the battle here comes down to, is laches available in copyright cases?

THE COURT: Well, hold on.

So I'm going to walk you through this because, as I say, the lawyers have been great in this case, but,

boy, not with this motion. 1 2 And, you know, I'm going to tell you a 3 real-life story, so that you appreciate this, especially 4 the Delaware lawyers. 5 So about three hours into my work on this 6 motion, I decided to call it quits. Okay. So let me give 7 you some examples of why. 8 What's the title of the motion? 9 MR. LOCASCIO: "Laches Bars J&J's Claim for 10 Disgorgement." 11 Well, let me --12 THE COURT: Hold up. Hold up, hold up. Sorry. 13 Forget what I was saying. I'm stuck on Number 2. So we're not going to argue Number 2 right now? 14 15 MR. LOCASCIO: I believe we just did argue --THE COURT: Well, we didn't argue it, 16 because -- not as far as I'm concerned. We argued an 17 issue that purveyed some issues. 18 19 But you think we've dispensed with Number 2? 20 MR. LOCASCIO: We could take a moment. But 21 Mr. Frank was going to do both, because the gating 22 question is JJSV's ability to be a party, have standing, 23 ergo seek lost profits. 24 THE COURT: Okay. 25 MR. FRANK: You're right. So in the briefing,

the idea that only AMO Development can recover its damages 1 was uncontested. They then argued that JJSV is a 2 3 beneficial owner. 4 But you've decided that issue, so I don't think 5 they're -- I think Summary Judgment 2 has been decided in 6 our favor. 7 THE COURT: Okay. Well, then we'll put it 8 We'll go to Number 3 then. 9 MR. LOCASCIO: I cannot -- we'll look at the 10 title, though. So if I need to -- apologize, I'll do it 11 from the lectern. THE COURT: Let's go to Number 3. 12 MR. LOCASCIO: 13 Okay. THE COURT: Now, this one is whether laches 14 15 bars the claim for disgorgement. 16 MR. LOCASCIO: Correct, Your Honor. 17 THE COURT: Okay. 18 MR. LOCASCIO: So I'd say the simplest way to 19 address this is: J&J takes a position that, I think, is 20 flatly inconsistent with Petrella, which says that its 21 unavailable. Laches is, full stop, unavailable. And 22 that's not what Petrella speaks to at all. 23 Petrella -- you flagged this a little bit in 24 the intro. Petrella says laches is not a threshold bar to

bringing a claim, under the Copyright Act, that was known

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prior to the statute of limitations, which is set forth in the statute. Full stop.

It then goes on to say that it's an equitable remedy, and disgorgement is an equitable claim. And that -- as you noted, the sentence says something to the effect of, delay is always available. It's -- I think it's strong as you said. It is always available as a defense to injunctive relief and allocation of -- or determination of the infringer's profits and their apportionment. Okay.

And so in the face of that, I don't think there's any question laches doesn't -- or it remains in existence.

And really, the only other thing the folks on the AMO side point to, is they have a cite -- and this comes up in the MIL as well -- a pretty bullish statement that says, this idea -- so I am going to blur the two, unless you really tell me not to -- which is, the questions of whether the -- it's a jury question or whether it is a bench trial question, Your Honor.

And why I flagged it as a threshold, really comes back to the question of: Is the relief of disgorgement equitable?

And so it is smack in the middle of Summary

Judgment Motion 3, because laches is available. I don't

think there's any credible argument that is not.

Their arguments in response are things like, well, it's not summary judgment worthy because we allege willful infringement, for instance.

And on that the case law there says, no, it actually has to not just be willfulness, but particularly egregious conduct that would prevent you from coming to the Court in equity. I don't think the facts support that at all here.

Willful infringement by itself is insufficient to preclude laches. That is the *Crown* case from District of Delaware. It's Judge Thynge's decision.

And even then, they also point to -- they say, vis-a-vis Alcon -- they say essentially the actions of one party are imputed.

So they say, well, if we look at this issue, everything done by the LenSx entities that have the former employees, who took the code, now has to roll its way up to Alcon Vision, because this disgorgement question is around IOLs, as well.

And we talked about this a little bit last week.

And their case -- they have to defenses: One is, we avoid summary judgment because it's willful, not the law.

THE COURT: Let me just hold you up, though.

Since I've held that -- if you're right that you win

Summary Judgment 2, are IOLs still in play for

disgorgement?

MR. LOCASCIO: So this one, to your point of,

how does this impact the case, we'll come back to you on

it as well.

Our summary judgment motion, to be fully frank on this -- Summary Judgment Motion 2 is only actual damages, which would not be disgorgement, are only available to AMO Development, because there's no loss to JJSV.

Okay. Because they don't have standing. So their losses don't count.

The disgorgement question of, what can you -- Motion 2 does not, on its face, seek to take disgorgement off the table for IOLs.

The Stamm motion -- you heard last week about, where's the causal link here?

When you take that together with the determination you just found to be JJSV, I think there is a very fair question right now of: Okay, if JJSV has no standing, can the entity that has not suffered any harm from IOL sales disgorge on a copyright that doesn't cover IOLs -- none of them do -- can they disgorge a -- in the

patent context convoyed sale downstream product?

I don't think there's any case anybody could point to on the other side that allows for that. We do not, to be fair, a summary judgment that asks for that request.

We say it should come out because it's not causal -- there's no causal nexus. Stamm shouldn't be able to say it.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LOCASCIO: It's ultimately a question for Your Honor, because this is an equitable remedy of disgorgement.

And so why I hesitated a little bit when you asked is, this shouldn't then roll into the jury with a 3-billion or 770-million-dollar IOL disgorgement claim, when there's no plaintiff with standing on damages, lost profits, reasonable royalty, that could ever get that money.

So have I answered your question on that?

THE COURT: Yes. And actually, you touched on what I was going to hit on, like -- again, you should go look at the title of your motion and then look at the -- well, not this minute. But look at the relief you asked for in your order.

MR. LOCASCIO: Okay.

THE COURT: All right. But -- and that's 1 partly why I'm confused. And -- but I hear you, I think. 2 3 Okay. Let's -- sticking with Number 3, what 4 you are asking for in Summary Judgment Number 3 is a 5 declaration that laches bars plaintiffs from disgorging 6 your profits. 7 MR. LOCASCIO: Correct. THE COURT: That's exactly what you're asking 8 9 for. Okay. 10 MR. LOCASCIO: Because of the delay, and they 11 knew. And they've known for, whatever the math comes out to be, since 2014 on this. 12 13 And the only thing they, then, point to is: Well, some of these FDA documents we didn't know about 14 15 until after we sued you. 16 And we point the Court to cases -- and I can 17 give them for Your Honor -- was, you knew enough to bring 18 a claim. 19 It's sort of the same argument they made 20 originally, Your Honor, which was, "We didn't know enough. 21 We knew there was copying." They stipulated they knew 22 there was copying. They had our product. They tore it 23 They looked at the code the best they could, and 24 they knew they had a claim.

And if they had brought the claim then -- this

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is akin -- it's a little bit -- it's a little different from mitigation.

But if they brought the claim then -- well, guess what? -- in the seven months after they brought the claim in 2020, they knew all about the FDA issues.

And if they brought the claim in 2014, well, they would have found out about it in 2015.

It's the same laches issue permeates all of the copyrights, Your Honor.

THE COURT: Right. All right.

But just because you can bring to bear at the remedial stage laches, doesn't mean you get to preclude a claim of disgorgement, right? You agree with that?

MR. LOCASCIO: I agree with you that assertion of laches, in and of itself, does not inherently grant you summary judgment.

But on the facts here, we -- if there was a dispute over what they knew, okay, well, then they get to bring the claim, we'd ultimately, in a bench trial in front of Your Honor on disgorgement and laches, hash that out.

Our view is: We don't need to do that because it's an undisputed fact that they knew there was copying in 2014. It's an undisputed fact that they knew the product was FDA approved. Obviously, it was out in the

marketplace, they got one.

And we know that within seven months of them bringing a claim, six years late, they learned about the remainder of their copyrights.

They've actually withdrawn -- and I don't know if Your Honor's aware on the statute of limitations issue, there were three classes of copyrights. There was software code; there was the operator's manual, and there were the FDA documents. And Your Honor said two of those are disputed fact questions, whether the statute applies.

They've since ceded one of those because the undisputed fact, it just wasn't briefed, Your Honor, is, they had the operator's manual.

THE COURT: Okay. So do you think -- where your argument falls, as I understand it is -- I mentioned at the outset today, there's three rules, right, that come out of Petrella.

The first rule is that you can never invoke laches to preclude adjudication of a damages claim within the statute of limitations.

You agree with that?

MR. LOCASCIO: As a threshold bar to pursue the claim, yes.

THE COURT: Can never do it.

All right. The second rule is -- and this only

applies to equitable relief -- "in extraordinary 1 circumstances, laches may bar, at the very threshold, the 2 3 particular relief requested." 4 That's what you're trying to win here; is that 5 right? 6 MR. LOCASCIO: I would say no because I think that is a gating question. 7 8 I view that as well as -- what Petrella says 9 there is -- okay. The case was dismissed and thrown out 10 because of the laches question, originally. 11 And what Petrella says is, okay, we're not going to say it's like a statute of limitations. It's 12 13 something can be dealt with right at the outset. But they say, in a particularly egregious case, 14 15 where if I knew about it for six years, and then I tried 16 to pull somebody off the market, or here in the case 17 that's cited there, like destroy buildings that are midway 18 through construction, that could be even a threshold 19 gating question, barring the claim in its entirety. 20 That's not we are asking for here. We're 21 saying --22 THE COURT: No. It says, "Laches may bar, at 23 the very threshold, the particular relief requested by the 24 plaintiff." 25 It doesn't say the claim. It says -- and it's

referred -- it literally says, quote, "As to equitable relief in extraordinary circumstances, laches may bar, at the very threshold, the particular relief requested by the plaintiff," unquote.

That's the second rule of Petrella.

The third rule is that, "A plaintiff's delay can always be brought to bear at the remedial stage in determining appropriate injunctive relief and in assessing the profits of the infringer attributable to the infringement."

So in other words — the point would be is, you absolutely get to bring in laches to mitigate or to determine the amount of profits for disgorgement, for instance. That, I think is clear.

But in order for you to bar them from even seeking the relief, which is what you're seeking to do here, you've got to fit within these extraordinary circumstances, it seems to me.

MR. LOCASCIO: So I don't believe that Petrella stands for the proposition that summary judgment is unavailable for laches. Which, I think, that's where we disagree on the second one, while I stopped it as a threshold question on the extraordinary relief. Okay.

I think it cannot --

THE COURT: So you think "very threshold" means

what? Motion to dismiss? 1 MR. LOCASCIO: I think it means, like the 2 statute of limitations, like Petrella before the Supreme 3 4 Court weighed in, treated laches. 5 Meaning, we don't care what the facts are here, 6 but we know a fact, which is, it's -- it predates in this 7 case --8 THE COURT: All right. Here's what I'm going 9 And partly it's time, but I thought a lot about 10 this. I disagree. 11 MR. LOCASCIO: Okay. I understand. 12 THE COURT: All right. I think those are three 13 very, very clear rules. So if you're going to win, you're going to have 14 15 to show that there are such extraordinary circumstances 16 here that, as a matter of law, laches bars, at the 17 threshold, disgorgement. 18 MR. LOCASCIO: Okay. 19 THE COURT: Now, there's two cases cited in 20 Petrella that are discussed, right? 21 I don't think -- I don't see how you meet 22 extraordinary circumstances given the Supreme Court's 23 discussion about those two cases in Petrella. 24 So give it your best shot. 25 MR. LOCASCIO: What I would say is, with

respect to laches on this motion on disgorgement, I would 1 say there's another aspect of their equitable relief 2 3 they're seeking, that's to take our product off the 4 market. I'd say that does fall within --5 THE COURT: I thought -- wait. Do we have to 6 argue that today? 7 MR. LOCASCIO: We don't have to argue that 8 today. 9 THE COURT: That's going to be down the road, 10 right? 11 MR. LOCASCIO: It's down the road. THE COURT: Okay. Then don't get there. 12 13 MR. LOCASCIO: Okay. THE COURT: Let's just stick with disgorgement. 14 15 MR. LOCASCIO: But on the question of 16 disgorgement, I'd say their desire to seek, as of today at 17 least, \$3 billion in disgorgement for IOLs, having never 18 said anything about it to us, when they knew in 2014, is 19 extraordinary circumstances. 20 They have watched this market unfold, both for 21 Catalys, okay, and LenSx to the lead. And now they have 22 watched us sell IOLs that have nothing to do with the 23 product it's tied to, they say. 24 THE COURT: Is your argument that it's 25 extraordinary because it's so much money?

MR. LOCASCIO: I would say it's not the 1 dollar -- not the quantum, Your Honor. But the idea that 2 3 their -- their goal here is to take all of the profits 4 away from a competitor, having sat silently for 5 eight years. 6 And the economic level, you could say the --7 THE COURT: When you say "all the profits," I 8 thought you guys told me last hearing that you actually 9 make \$13 billion a year in IOL sales, you don't make 10 three. 11 MR. LOCASCIO: These are all revenue numbers. 12 First of all, their numbers they're pointing to are 13 because they don't count costs in there. Recall, there's still a battle over that. 14 15 THE COURT: Okay. 16 MR. LOCASCIO: But their -- yes, they have 17 found it. Not the biggest possible number to ask for. 18 But I would say the extraordinary remedy sought 19 in the cases discussed in Petrella, which is the 20 architecture case, the economic impact of that -- could it 21 be in excess of \$3 billion? I'd say it probably wasn't. 22 But at the end of day, their request here is 23 extraordinary, Your Honor, and so we think it qualifies.

Now -- but to be fair, we have a disagreement

as to Rule 2 of Petrella, which is, I think --

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1 THE COURT: No, we don't have to repeat the 2 argument. 3 MR. LOCASCIO: I know. 4 THE COURT: We only have limited time. 5 you've made it. I don't agree with you. 6 MR. LOCASCIO: I understand that. 7 THE COURT: You can make it later on. 8 MR. LOCASCIO: And then the other aspects that 9 they're arguing are that it's not available, I don't think 10 we need to spend any time on that because I think 11 Your Honor agrees with me that laches is available and 12 that the disgorgement relief is equitable. 13 So it would only then be a question, 14 Your Honor. I think the only question that separates my 15 summary judgment motion and where Your Honor is: 16 okay, does this issue, these equitable issues of 17 disgorgement and laches and what they knew, have to, then, 18 be heard evidentiarily by Your Honor? 19 Because if it's available --20 THE COURT: Now you're getting into the jury 21 Is that where you're going? question. 22 MR. LOCASCIO: I think that's the only 23 difference between whether summary judgment is applicable 24 here in the face of what are undisputed facts. 25 Because Your Honor's rules, under Petrella,

would be --

THE COURT: No, I disagree with you because -- here's why. Because I'm going to deny this.

I mean, I'm going to deny the motion because you haven't, right now, laid out extraordinary circumstances in my mind. I'm not saying you couldn't, but you didn't do it.

The two cases discussed in the Petrella decision, to give a preview, essentially, of what the Supreme Court deemed to be extraordinary circumstances, are the *Chirco* case from the Sixth Circuit and the *New Era Publications* case from the Second Circuit.

And the Court spend most of its time discussing Chirco. And in the Chirco case you had a situation where the defendants were accused of using, without permission, a copyright to plan and develop a housing development.

Basically, the copyright had to do with architectural design. And after 168 homes were built and 109 were occupied, it was then that a copyright infringement case was alleged.

So you had an extraordinary situation where you had homes that had been built, third parties who were completely innocent who were residing in the homes, and there was a request to destroy the homes. And the Supreme Court said that's extraordinary.

The second case was the New Era Publications

case. And that was where -- and it implicated First

Amendment rights -- a book was published. And it wasn't

until two years after the book had been published that a

restraining order was sought by the plaintiff based on a

copyright claim. And sought, as injunctive relief, total

destruction of all the books that were out there. Which

again, implicates third parties, who bought the books, had

no idea.

Now, you compare that to what was before the Court in *Petrella*, which was much more similar to here, a disgorgement of profits remedy. And what the Court said, that the equitable relief that *Petrella* was seeking, for example, disgorgement of unjust gains and an injunction against future infringement, would not result in total destruction of the film that was at issue, the Raging Bull film, or anything close to it. That was the language of the Supreme Court.

So you know, in other words, the Raging Bull case before it in Petrella did not involve a request to destroy the film itself or, to use the Supreme Court's words, "anything close to it," unquote.

And then the Court went on and it said, quote, "Allowing Petrella's suit to go forward would put at risk only a fraction of the income MGM has earned during that

period, and will work no unjust hardship on innocent third parties, such as consumers who have purchased copies of the book."

And you haven't alleged here anything to explain the impact of the income you lost. You've thrown a number up there, 3.1 billion, but I don't know if that's a fraction of the income that the defendants made.

I don't know the real hardship that the defendants would suffer. I don't know the effect on third parties.

All you've alleged is the -- this big, big number. And it is a big number. But that's not enough.

And so at the summary judgment stage, I'm going to deny the summary judgment motion.

But, under the third rule of *Petrella*, there's no question that you are going to get the opportunity to present in the -- on the issue of disgorgement, the delay that the plaintiffs caused or took in bringing this suit.

All right. So the judgment is denied.

And if I have to, depending on how the case unfolds, I may write something on this, but I think I've articulated enough to explain why I'm denying the motion.

MR. LOCASCIO: Okay. I think it's another threshold question that is tied to this, which is why I tied them together, which is, ultimately, two motions in

1 limine raise the question of: Who hears the evidence on 2 disgorgement? 3 THE COURT: Right. I agree with that, and 4 also, what evidence they hear. We haven't decided that 5 with Stamm. 6 And that's why I'm going through the order I 7 am, because I think some of these may get resolved. 8 All right. Let's quickly then -- let's go next 9 to disgorgement. Is it a jury question? How should it be 10 presented? 11 MR. LOCASCIO: It's our Motion in Limine 3. THE COURT: Right. All right. Go ahead. 12 MR. LOCASCIO: Thank you. 13 There's no question it's equitable under 14 15 I won't revisit that. Petrella. 16 THE COURT: It's not. That -- look, the 17 question is: Do you have any cases that say disgorgement 18 needs to be presented to a jury -- or sorry, can only be 19 presented to a judge? I take that back. 20 In other words, that where a Court says 21 point-blank disgorgement must be presented to a judge and 22 only a judge. MR. LOCASCIO: So I want to answer your 23 24 question, which is yes, but there's two prongs to that. 25 The first is, I think, all of the cases, except perhaps the one case out of Eddy, Texas that was -- that my colleague cited, say it's a question for the Court, and you can send it as an advisory verdict.

So the law is, it is a question for Your Honor to decide with findings at some point either in the --

THE COURT: What's the best case you have that point-blank says that disgorgement must be decided by a judge?

MR. LOCASCIO: Okay. I want to give you -- I'm going to give you three.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. LOCASCIO: Okay? First one is, Fair Isaac,
District of Minnesota, 408 F.Supp.3d 1019.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. LOCASCIO: And the reason I started with that, even though it is District of Minnesota is, it's a copyright case that then cites to the Federal Circuit, TAOS 895 F.3d 1304, which says there is no Seventh Amendment right to disgorgement of profits. It walks through -- it's a trade secret case, and it walks through the patent, trademark and copyright cases to say, for disgorgement, where it is not a proxy -- and there's no dispute it's not a proxy here -- it's not a jury question, it's a question for the Court.

And then third is actually a case that declines

1 to give a -- even have an advisory verdict on this, and it's Assessment Technologies -- is also in our briefing --2 2022 Westlaw 588889 on this. And --3 4 THE COURT: Which court is that? 5 MR. LOCASCIO: District of Kansas. 6 THE COURT: That's Judge Robinson. Okay. 7 MR. LOCASCIO: And so what's happened here is, 8 you have Petrella which says equitable, and then in the 9 wake of Petrella, you say: What are the other cases that 10 come after that? 11 And TAOS is one from the Federal Circuit that 12 looks at this, and then now district courts have treated 13 it.

> It has not gone back up in any way for a Court of Appeals to, specifically in a copyright context, look at this.

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But the cases on the other side -- and their argument is -- they start with Beacon and Dairy Queen antitrust case, trademark case from the late '50s, early '60s, that just say "if you seek accounting," that doesn't negate the jury, right, on the underlying claim. Okay, that's fine.

But on the issue of: What about the disgorgement remedy? The only case they really can point to then is this Kraft case -- or Krofft case, the

Sid Krofft case from the Nine Circuit, which says in a copyright case, they're going to treat disgorgement as a -- not a jury issue.

Except, if you look at TAOS and Fair Isaac, both of them walk through the history and take issue with that, because that case is based on a decision that wasn't actually disgorgement, and the Krofft case actually wasn't seeking disgorgement in the same way they are here either.

THE COURT: Okay.

 $\ensuremath{\mathsf{MR}}\xspace.$ LOCASCIO: So those are the best cases on that.

And then the other piece of this MIL as to why it's not adversarial — not okay to send in advisory verdict is what you identified, it's *Uniloc*. Federal Circuit saying, if you throw out a big number, sort of level set everyone to a smaller number.

Which is why, if you sought billions of dollars in disgorgement -- as they do here -- but you had \$100 million, \$200 million, \$50 million in actual damages, okay, the Court can decide disgorgement. You shouldn't have the jury hearing all that, because then, guess what? The goal -- I mean, everybody knows the plan here.

The plan is, have the jury say, well, somewhere around the middle there seems like a reasonable number with two big companies. And that's why it's prejudicial.

1 THE COURT: Okay. Thank you. 2 MR. LOCASCIO: Thank you. 3 MR. MORIN: May I respond, Your Honor? 4 THE COURT: No. Just joking. 5 MR. MORIN: My mom taught me to be polite. 6 Sorry. 7 THE COURT: Of course you may. 8 MR. MORIN: Okay. I have a lot to say on the 9 merits, but why don't I start with where my friend 10 finished. 11 His lead case was Fair Isaac. He said it's his 12 best case, Number 1. And he says we shouldn't present 13 disgorgement to the jury because they'll hear a big 14 number, and that will put them in a position where they're 15 desensitized. 16 The Fair Isaac case last week, just last 17 week -- and my friend referred to it. May I pass up last 18 week's decision? There was a subsequent decision that my 19 friend referred to. 20 THE COURT: Yeah, sure. 21 MR. MORIN: The issue of bifurcation came up, 22 whether the judge should hear it separately. 23 Oh, I'm sorry. May I? 24 THE COURT: Yeah, please. 25 MR. MORIN: Whether the judge should hear it

separately. The Fair Isaac case involves FICO, you know, the credit scoring agency. The disgorgement revenue number was \$45 billion and the damages requested were 27 or 34 million. I have it here.

And the Court said, forget desensitization, there's overlapping issues, witnesses, all that type of thing, and jury instructions and the rest of it can deal with it.

And it distinguished *Uniloc*, actually. Because whatever you say is appropriate to send on disgorgement, Your Honor, is legally fair.

Uniloc, the point was, the entire market value rule doesn't make the \$19 billion against Microsoft relevant for anything.

They made the point here, the same judge on their Number 1 case says, it's no problem hearing \$45 billion on the revenue number even if your damages number is less on the advisory verdict.

But let me get to the main question presented.

I'll take a moment if Your Honor wants to glance at that or has some questions about that.

THE COURT: Just give me one second. Yeah, please.

MR. MORIN: That judge, but the way, addresses Uniloc and explains why it's okay in that decision.

Uniloc discussion is on Page 13, Your Honor. 1 2 didn't mean to interrupt you. 3 THE COURT: No, no. That's good. Thanks. 4 All right. Just from skimming it right away, 5 the judge is, I think, going to say that the \$45 billion 6 is relevant to the royalty, to the damages. So it's going 7 to come in. 8 MR. MORIN: What he's saying -- and part of 9 that is that there's overlapping evidence. Here, for 10 example, in the reasonable royalty --11 THE COURT: Wait. Hold on. Am I right? Because I'm skimming this. Is that right? 12 13 Is that what he's saying, that the 45-billion figure is going to be relevant to the damages request, 14 15 which is going to be made before the jury? 16 MR. MORIN: Yes, with a qualification. 17 THE COURT: All right. 18 MR. MORIN: If I may. 19 THE COURT: Yeah, please. 20 MR. MORIN: The answer is yes. I'll answer 21 your question yes. 22 It's a little bit of technicality. What they 23 agreed would go before the jury is \$13 billion. And he 24 said, "^13, 45, what's the difference at the end of the 25 day? A little bit."

But, Your Honor, my point on that is, in the reasonable royalty analysis, in the same exact way, our expert will be talking about the revenues in the royalty context.

THE COURT: So I'm going to get to that because that's what -- so that, for me, is like a threshold issue. Is, I think the defendant has to admit that if disgorgement is a proxy, or if the total revenues are a proxy for damages or involved in the damages calculation, it's going to get in front of the jury anyway.

But what your friend did say was, pretty early on in his argument was that, we don't have that situation here.

He said it's not a -- the words he used was, it's not a proxy for damages. That doesn't mean it's not going to cited in your expert damages opinion.

So before you do anything, why don't you tell me -- we talked about this in the beginning -- what are the -- what's a three-headed monster?

And if at the end of day this gross revenue figure is coming in any way, let me know.

MR. MORIN: Yeah. So the three-headed monster -- still hoping it has three heads.

The three-headed monster is disgorgement, which is the -- obviously, the infringer's profits, is one

bucket. And actual damages has two components. So there's three heads.

The lost profits component that we've talked about a little bit, and the reasonable royalty component that we haven't talked about today, and that they haven't moved on.

In the reasonable royalty, as in almost all reasonable royalty cases, she looks at the Book of Wisdom and one of the factors in what the royalty would have been is the revenues that they've achieved from the sales, the infringer's profits, basically.

Paragraph 277 on, in her opening expert report, talk about that. They have haven't objected. They haven't moved to strike, anything like that.

THE COURT: So is the number coming in?

MR. MORIN: Yeah, the number is coming in.

THE COURT: All right. Before we have any further argument, then --

MR. LOCASCIO: I couldn't disagree more strongly. The reasonable royalty is not on IOLs. This IOL number is not part of the reasonable royalty calculation.

THE COURT: All right. So why don't you show me the report, because this is like -- for you guys to be disagreeing, I should be --

MR. MORIN: Right. And I think I can -- I 1 think I can -- the IOL number is not in there. 2 3 When we talk about the overall sales of LenSx 4 and all the other things for disgorgement, those numbers 5 are in there. 6 I want to be very, very clear on that. That's 7 true. 8 THE COURT: Wait. Those numbers are or are not 9 in there? 10 MR. MORIN: Are in there. 11 The LenSx sales numbers, Paragraph 277 of her 12 opening report, those numbers are on there. She does not 13 quantify the IOL numbers in the royalty. 14 THE COURT: Okay. All right. This is all 15 about IOL numbers. 16 MR. MORIN: That part, that's true. And he's 17 accurate on that, just to be clear. 18 THE COURT: Okay. 19 MR. MORIN: But the other thing that the 20 Fair Isaac case does --21 THE COURT: But wait --22 MR. MORIN: Yeah. Sure. 23 THE COURT: -- if I ruled that JJSV can't recover, then IOL -- are IOL sales out? I mean, let's --24 25 so why -- maybe we better resolve that. Because to me,

they would be out if JJSV isn't part of the...

MR. MORIN: No, Your Honor. And that's where I
hope to clarify and be helpful.

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you do that

THE COURT: All right. Why don't you do that first, address that.

MR. MORIN: Okay. So disgorgement and actual damages are obviously two different things.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MORIN: On the lost profits side of the equation, you've ruled that JJSV can't recover its profits. It can't say, "I've been harmed by this amount."

Disgorgement is a creature of copyright law in part because oftentimes plaintiffs haven't been harmed, and therefore -- even JJSV hasn't been -- is not in the case, and saying maybe AMO Development can't recover all of JJSV's.

It's not unusual. Petrella, all these other cases -- someone write a song, someone does something and it gets stolen -- disgorgement is there for the circumstance where you can't prove your actual damages or where your actual damages won't do the trick.

It's there for the very reason that it may be the case that even though JJSV is not in the case and can't recover its lost profits, that if someone has stolen code, as we contend -- and it's not at dispute right

1 now --2 THE COURT: Right. 3 MR. MORIN: -- and is profited by its theft, we 4 don't have to prove disgorgement with any harm to 5 ourselves. 6 So JJSV coming out of the case and not being 7 able to claim its damages -- which I think we agreed on at 8 the beginning of argument -- does not affect the 9 disgorgement issue. 10 It's a totally different issue of what they 11 made --12 THE COURT: Okay. 13 MR. MORIN: -- and what they have to disgorge. Have I clarified that? Explained that well enough? 14 15 THE COURT: You have. 16 All right. In other words, just the way I put 17 it in my own words is, your point's going to be, hey, 18 disgorgement is unjust enrichment. It could include IOL 19 sales, regardless of whether JJSV is a party or whether 20 it's got a beneficial ownership, period. 21 The question is going to be: MR. MORIN: 22 much have they benefited from their infringement, right? 23 And then there may be an apportionment and there may be

money taken out, but it's unjust enrichment, kind of

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basic, idea.

THE COURT: All right. Hold on. 1 2 MR. MORIN: Yeah. 3 THE COURT: Does somebody have a copy of 4 504(b)? 5 MR. MORIN: Sure. I can pass one up if it's 6 helpful, Your Honor. Would you like a copy? 7 THE COURT: Yeah, please. Oh, no. I have 8 mine. 9 Okay. I'm with you. Go ahead. 10 MR. MORIN: Okay. So -- and by the way, it 11 makes sense in copyright cases, because lots of the time someone gets something stolen. You know, I write a song. 12 13 It's hard to imagine. I can't really show I would have 14 done anything with the song. 15 Big Pimpin' is the example, right? The 16 Jay-Z --17 THE COURT: I know. 18 MR. MORIN: There is a famous Jay-Z situation. But I write a song, Mike Morin writes a terrible song and 19 20 Kirkland goes out and uses it in an advertisement. I 21 can't prove that I was actually damaged by that. I am 22 entitled to disgorge the profits. 23 And I'll only make one little side comment. 24 There's a lot of victim blaming going on here. They stole 25 our code and put it in their products. I mean, at the end

of day, we're entitled to relief for their theft and what 1 we think is willful theft. And that's what it's all 2 3 about. 4 THE COURT: All right. I'm with you. So then 5 the bottom line is, I got to address this jury question no 6 matter what. 7 MR. MORIN: That's correct. 8 THE COURT: All right. 9 MR. MORIN: And so the two principles come out 10 The first is, even their lead case -- and that's of that. 11 what I was going to get to. 12 THE COURT: Oh, yeah. The Minnesota one, 13 right? Okay. MR. MORIN: The Minnesota case. Even in that 14 15 lead case, there were two comments. 16 The first is that the amount of money is not an 17 excuse. Uniloc was a situation. You're going to lay in 18 front of the jury whatever you think is relevant to the 19 damages of the claim. 20 The Uniloc decision basically said that 21 \$19 billion wasn't relevant to anything in the case. And 22 that's what it says on Page 13. 23 But the more important point, I think, is on 24 Pages 16 to 17, Your Honor --25

THE COURT: Yeah.

MR. MORIN: -- where there's basically an acknowledgement here -- and this was the point I led on -- which is, whether you call it advisory or whether you just send it to the jury, even their best case says, I don't know what the Eight Circuit is going to do with this thing.

And so, Your Honor, I will tell you -- and I'm going to make a good pitch, I think, if you'll let me, as to why this is a jury issue. And I think it's been decided that way. I'm going to make the pitch to you.

But one thing is clear, and our friends agree, this hasn't been addressed by the -- the Federal Circuit would be applying Third Circuit law directly.

And if you don't have a record of this thing, you've got a new trial if someone upstairs disagrees with you, as opposed to taking a record of it.

So you don't actually have to decide the issue now. If you decide it for us, it would be a pure jury issue. If you decide against us, it's an advisory.

The Sysco Court, Judge Freeman, she said, "I'll send it to the jury and I'll sort it out later, basically, whether it's advisory or a permanent."

So let me get to a quick response, if I may, because I think it's an important and interesting issue on whether it goes to the judge or the jury, Your Honor, if I

may.

THE COURT: Uh-huh.

MR. MORIN: So Your Honor is familiar that there's two ways, of course, that a case can end up in front of the jury. One is a statutory and one is constitutional.

And I would tell you that I think

Judge Payne -- familiar with Judge Payne in the Eastern

District of Texas -- he wrote a Hoffman decision a year

and a half ago. And I'm not citing it for the weight of
the Eastern District; although, I think he's a fine judge
who we both appear in front of a lot.

He goes through really thorough, really good analysis. And his point is the same point that Feltner makes from the Supreme Court, is: If you have a statute that's possible to be interpreted to avoid a constitutional issue, the question of constitutional voidance, you should do it.

And you go to 504(b). And what he did is, he went to 504(b) and he says, "Unlike 504" -- and I don't know if you only have 504(b) or if you have the others.

But he says, "Unlike in the other provisions, it does not use the word 'Court' and who is going to decide this. The word 'Court' is absent, unlike in other provisions."

And then he goes on to look at the Feltner

decision, which is a Supreme Court case, Your Honor. Are you familiar with Feltner, if I may.

So the *Feltner* decision is looking at 504(c), and it says, "We don't see the word 'Court' here" -- right? -- "We have the word 'Court' here," I'm sorry. In 504(c), it says, "the Court shall decide."

And the Supreme Court, the Supreme Court says in a recent decision, when they look at 504(b), which is our provision, it says, "The Copyright Act does not use the term 'Court' in the subsection addressing words of actual damages and profits, see 504(b), which generally are thought to constitute legal relief."

This is the Supreme Court talking about 504(b).

And the whole point with Judge Payne is, he says, I respect the judge in Minnesota, and there's all sorts of ways to read this. But if there's a way to read it to avoid the constitutional issue, he says, we do it.

And he also says that it's an odd combination -- it would be an odd combination to have a legal remedy of damages in the same provision side by side with, right -- connected with the protean relief of -- it's what the Supreme Court has called it -- of disgorgement and say that the jury is not deciding that either.

And then his third rationale -- and I'd implore

Your Honor to read the *Hoffman* case because it —— the *Hoffman* case —— is that he cites ten cases where the Courts have sent this issue to the jury. And he said we're upsetting settled law here, where this has been happening, including cases that have analyzed it. And my friend identified one of those, the *Sid and Marty Krofft* case.

So he says we can deal with it on a statutory basis. And then he says -- on the constitutional question, he says -- Judge Payne says, "I think it also -- you have a constitutional right, but I don't have to get there."

Now, if we're going to go to the constitutional question, if Your Honor is going to consider it, we have the advantage. He talked about a Federal Circuit case that dealt with trade secrets. Which, by the way, trade secrets are a little bit different. They have their principles and equity and their derivation in equity.

But he talked about the Federal Circuit case.

I'm sorry, I'm going too fast, aren't I?
He talked about the Federal Circuit case.

If you look at another Federal Circuit case in Re Technologies, looked back at the *Root versus Railway* Supreme Court case and says, it's an issue for the jury.

It's an issue of law. So the Federal Circuit had gone

both ways.

You're fortunate enough to be sitting in the Third Circuit, which has answered this. The *Kennedy* case answered this question --

THE COURT: Is it the *Lakso* case?

MR. MORIN: Yeah, the Lakso case.

THE COURT: I don't agree with you. It didn't answer that question.

MR. MORIN: Well, okay. Let me say why it's instructive and why I think it's answered it. And then, of course, you're the judge, you can disagree.

In that case -- it was a patent case. And in that case, it clearly says at the beginning they were asking for both damages and accounting for profits, right?

And then the Court did the same thing that the Supreme Court did in the *Dairy Queen* case and says, even if you can kind of call it equitable in some way, that doesn't mean you don't go to the jury on the issue.

And it says, "No distinction could be drawn that would justify recognition of the right to jury trial for damages and denial in a claim for profits on the theory that damages are recoverable in an action at law, whereas profits have their origin in equitable principles."

And they go on to conclude, just like

Justice Harlan in the *Dairy Queen* case, that the jury is perfectly capable of dealing with these issues on accounting and they should go to the jury.

And the same thing in the *Dairy Queen* case and Justice Harlan's --

THE COURT: Because time's at issue.

MR. MORIN: Yeah.

THE COURT: Look, I've read Lakso; I've read

Dairy Queen. I don't think they stand for that principle.

I think what they stand for, the principle is that there

was an old rule, that if you had legal and equitable

claims --

MR. MORIN: Right.

THE COURT: -- and that if the equitable claims were predominant, then you -- under the old rule, you lost the right to a trial to a jury.

MR. MORIN: Right.

THE COURT: And what Justice Black comes along in Dairy Queen, he says, no, no, no. If you've got some legal claim there, even if the equitable claim predominates, you still have your right to trial by jury.

And Lakso is just recognizing that and explaining it. And so that's why the issue in Lakso is whether or not the lability claim, the infringement, which is indisputably a right to trial by jury was lost by the

1 presence of an equitable claims. 2 Let's just move on because I've got limited 3 time. 4 MR. MORIN: May I have one sentence on that? 5 THE COURT: No. Come on. 6 MR. MORIN: Okay. 7 Anyway, so in any even, Wright & Miller, and 8 the other treatises credited for that issue. 9 And Your Honor has read all these cases, so I 10 know you have limited time. I have said my peace. 11 would --12 THE COURT: All right. Here's what I'm going 13 I'm going to think about this one for some more. Let's go through, quickly, the other motions in limine I 14 15 think we can dispense with. 16 Actually, do you want to say -- it's your 17 reply, so you can go ahead. 18 MR. LOCASCIO: I have two points I want to say 19 to that, Your Honor. 20 Thank you, Your Honor. MR. MORIN: 21 THE COURT: Thank you. 22 MR. LOCASCIO: On the jury question, the motion 23 in limine we're talking about, my colleague just said, 24 well, the Federal Circuit has gone both ways, except In Re 25 Tech licensing is pre-Petrella; TAOS is post-Petrella,

1 which says it's equitable. And it walks through each 2 regime. 3 So I think the TAOS case from the Federal 4 Circuit tells us exactly what would happen to this on 5 appeal. It's an issue for Your Honor. 6 Feltner actually says it's not a question of 7 statutory construction. 8 And then the two other cases I pointed to, the 9 District Court case from Kansas, walks through how that's 10 dicta. 11 And, ultimately, Petrella comes after Feltner, 12 and couldn't be clearer that this is equitable in 13 Footnote 1 of the Petrella --14 THE COURT: Right. There's no dispute it's 15 equitable. You don't dispute the disgorgement is 16 equitable, do you? 17 MR. MORIN: I do for the purposes of 18 disgorgement. 19 In that footnote, I think what they're talking 20 about is the laches aspect. It says it's protean. It has 21 aspects from each. And it says, "for the purposes of 22 this. It is for the purposes of this, we'll treat it as 23 equitable." 24 I believe -- and by the way, the equitable

label is not necessarily dominating Dairy Queen, and the

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1 other cases say that. But I don't think it's so clear that on the 2 3 question of disgorgement that it is -- itself is -- they 4 say it's confusing and protean, I think what they're 5 referring to is laches in that point in time, because 6 that's an issue --7 THE COURT: -- referring to by protean. 8 They're quoting the restatement. 9 MR. MORIN: Yeah. 10 THE COURT: In the commentary, the restatement 11 is talking about how it's protean. It varies. It's fact 12 specific --13 MR. MORIN: That's right. THE COURT: -- and you've got to figure it out. 14 15 Sometimes it's legal, sometimes it's equitable, sometimes 16 it overlaps. And they're talking about unjust enrichment. 17 I don't know. 18 All right. Anything else? 19 MR. LOCASCIO: Yes. To be clear, it says, "This remedy is equitable." That's Footnote 1 of 20 21 Petrella. 22 THE COURT: Right. And his point is, it does 23 say, "in this case." 24 So, but I think you have the better reading. 25 They clearly say -- I think Petrella makes clear,

1 disgorgement for copyright cases is equitable. 2 MR. LOCASCIO: And the last point on Petrella is, at 687, it said, "Should Petrella ultimately prevail 3 4 on the merits, the District Court, in determining 5 appropriate injunctive relief and assessing profits, may 6 take into account delay in commencing suit." 7 So Petrella even contemplates who will 8 ultimately determine the profits, the Court, at the same 9 time it does injunctive relief. There is no question, 10 obviously, is not a jury issue. 11 THE COURT: Right. 12 MR. LOCASCIO: And... 13 THE COURT: Okay. 14 MR. LOCASCIO: That's all I have on that, 15 Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: Yeah. I'm very much leaning 17 towards it does not go to the jury. I need to think just 18 a little bit, but that's -- just so you'll know. 19 I'll let you know for sure by February 6. 20 MR. LOCASCIO: One other point I do want to 21 make on this is the advisory verdict argument, the 22 Fair Isaac case. 23 Fair Isaac, as you even saw in just your skim 24 of it, says, the defendants agree, the big numbers going

in front of jury, and it's relevant to the -- in that

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1 case, a royalty calculation. That's not this case. 2 THE COURT: Right. Because the IOLs are not 3 going to be included. 4 MR. LOCASCIO: Correct, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Right. But now I'm just 6 wondering -- well, no, that's right. Because your 7 position and the plaintiffs' position is, notwithstanding 8 my ruling today about JJSV, they still want to bring in 9 the big number for disgorgement. 10 They think they can, is my inclination, 11 especially if it's -- certainly, they can bring it if it's front of me. 12 MR. LOCASCIO: If it's in front of you --13 THE COURT: You don't care. 14 15 MR. LOCASCIO: -- this is obviously much less 16 of an issue.

If it's in front of the jury, we will come back to you on the question of -- and there's two questions, as I see them. If it's front of a jury, this is a *Uniloc* situation that I don't think the *Fair Isaac* decision, there it's different than here.

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But also, the availability or eligibility of a case where JJSV has no beneficial ownership for the remaining entities to disgorge on IOLs, because they have a disgorgement argument for FLACS machines, and we're not

taking issues with that. FLACS machines being the LenSx 1 2 machine. 3 THE COURT: Yeah, yeah. But, I mean, he's got 4 I mean, disgorgement is an equitable remedy. 5 It's fairness. And it's the -- the unjust enrichment is 6 what's being addressed. And you can argue that should 7 include convoyed sales, all sorts of things. 8 We don't have to deal with it. 9 I'm putting a hold -- I'm withholding judgment 10 on the third motion in limine. My inclination is to not 11 let disgorgement go in front of the jury. I'll think about it some more. We'll talk 12 about February 6. 13 Let's quickly run through the other motions in 14 15 limine. I think we can make some progress. 16 Start with Number 1 for the plaintiff. 17 MR. MORIN: Is that me? 18 MR. CHIN: Very briefly, Your Honor. 19 This is the motion that seeks to preclude Alcon 20 from asserting that LenSx is a different entity. That 21 part is actually now undisputed. 22 And also, that it -- that the knowledge of the 23 LenSx employees are imputable to Alcon and LenSx. 24 that part still remains for the Court to decide. 25 THE COURT: Okay. Hold up. Sorry. Give me a

1 second. 2 Okay. I'm very sorry. I now have it in front 3 of me. 4 MR. CHIN: Sure. 5 Our motion in limine, Number 1, the Alcon-LenSx 6 issue. 7 THE COURT: Okay. So the first thing you want 8 is, they can't suggest Alcon Research is different from 9 LenSx, right? 10 MR. CHIN: Yes. And I believe they --11 **THE COURT:** That's moot, right? 12 MS. HEFFERNAN: Yes. Yes, Your Honor. 13 THE COURT: You said that. Okay. 14 MR. CHIN: And just as a procedural matter, as 15 you recall, this issue did come in preliminary injunction 16 context where --17 THE COURT: I don't recall. But anyway, I'll 18 take your word on it. MR. CHIN: Okay. Does that -- I'm just 19 20 wondering, does that become an order or we just live by 21 their representations in the papers here? 22 THE COURT: I trust both of you all. I mean, 23 you know, they said they are not going to do it. If they 24 do, call them on it. And I'll be pretty angry. 25 MR. CHIN: Understood.

THE COURT: I do not believe they will. All 1 2 right. 3 Two, that Alcon can't suggest that it lacks 4 knowledge -- or lacks, sorry -- it lacks Alcon Research's 5 knowledge. 6 You've also agreed you're not going to do that, 7 correct? 8 MS. HEFFERNAN: That one, I think, we're going 9 to need to argue. 10 THE COURT: Okay. All right. 11 MR. CHIN: The knowledge of the -- perhaps, I can just clarify. The knowledge of -- I think there are 12 two knowledge parts. One is Alcon Research lacks 13 14 LenSx's -- the corporation's knowledge. 15 THE COURT: Right. I thought they were okay 16 with that. 17 MR. CHIN: I thought so too. MS. HEFFERNAN: Well, we -- I think we're going 18 19 to have to argue this, because we would not contest any 20 knowledge that is legally imputable to LenSx. 21 There is a -- I think we're going to need to 22 argue this. 23 THE COURT: Okay. Is this going to, basically, 24 boil down to, I think, it's -- we're going to have an 25 employee, and the question is going to be, the employee

knew something, and whether that knowledge was gained 1 2 during the scope of the employment or whether it was 3 imputable to LenSx. 4 MR. CHIN: That's correct. 5 THE COURT: Isn't that where the rubber hits 6 the road? 7 MR. CHIN: It is. And the restatement standard is, is it material to the agents' duties to LenSx, the 8 9 principle --10 THE COURT: Right. 11 MR. CHIN: -- which we know is renamed Alcon Research. 12 13 And on that point, there are two points that we 14 cite in the briefs that we think are important. 15 Number 1, Alcon already took the position in 16 upholding the common interest privilege, that these 17 individuals -- and let me quote their language to make 18 sure I'm not misquoting it here. 19 "Goldstein and Vardin" -- two of the 20 programmers -- "primary duties involved writing source 21 code for the LenSx system." That sounds an awful lot like the restatement 22 23 Is it material to the agents' duties? standard: 24 writing the software material to the agents' duties? 25 THE COURT: Right.

MR. CHIN: Now, Alcon argues that it's a fact 1 issue, and perhaps, it's a fact issue. But here it's a 2 3 fact issue that is undisputed, that it's propounded by 4 Alcon itself. 5 And under 403, of course, there's significant 6 undue prejudice if they're allowed to argue something 7 that -- their common interest motion itself. 8 THE COURT: See, I'm trying to figure out --9 like, what I don't get from reading the motions is how 10 this is going to arise. 11 And I think it could arise, like you're -- I mean, essentially, you're both going to be taking a risk, 12 13 and at the end of the day, I'm going to rule, and it's 14 going to be in front of the jury. And whoever loses,

loses big.

I mean, give me the specific example. Like, how is it going to arise?

Give me a question you're going to bring up that you already know they're going to object to. I mean, I'm trying to figure out how this is going to come --

> MR. CHIN: Sure.

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And perhaps I can try to remind you of how it came up in the preliminary injunction hearing.

THE COURT: Okay.

MR. CHIN: They made an argument that LenSx

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LenSx."

gave representations and warranties from the -- and this 1 is a quote from the hearing -- "from the people who sold 3 it to us; namely, the programmers who are part of the company." THE COURT: Right. But if they did that at trial, right, then they 7 can -- you get a curative jury instruction, right, that they were LenSx, and so they are the people who sold it to them. 10 I mean, don't you cure any argument with a jury 11 instruction? MR. CHIN: If that instruction is given to the 12 13 jury, I suppose that would cure that specific issue. 14 We're trying to nip this in the bud by getting 15 a ruling that this doesn't have to come up in the first 16 place. 17 THE COURT: But it's the hypothetical, I guess. So, you know, because you're asking -- you know, you're --18 19 I go by the motions in front of me. 20 I mean, the motion, it says -- the motion 21 literally says, "Preclude them from arguing or suggesting,

They said they're not going to do it.

one, that Alcon Research is a different entity from

Two, that "Alcon Research lacks knowledge held

by LenSx employees about matters material to their duties."

Now, it sounds like they're hedging, but it seems to me, I would instruct, as a matter of law, whether -- you know, something about if an employee gained knowledge during the scope of its employment, that knowledge is attributable to the company.

And then you can all argue this was computer programming while this employee was working for LenSx, of course it's imputable.

Or you can tell me, because I don't know, I mean, maybe I'm supposed to -- I'll just, as a matter of law, tell them that.

I'm trying to figure out how it's going to come up. I think — it sounds like you might be anticipating they're being way more aggressive than they're going to be, but maybe not.

MR. CHIN: Perhaps. And, you know, if it simplifies things, we could narrow it down to, really, who's at issue.

Obviously, there's a lot of employees involved. But as you probably recall from the preliminary injunction motion, there's really three employees involved.

There is Goldstein, the director of software engineering at Alcon Research; Hegedus, the senior

principal engineer at Alcon Research; and Vardin, 1 associate director, principal software engineer at Alcon 2 3 Research. 4 THE COURT: Okay. 5 MR. CHIN: Those are the three individuals who --6 7 THE COURT: Are you going to play their 8 depositions? 9 MR. CHIN: We are going to play their 10 depositions. 11 THE COURT: Okay. And what are they going to They're going to say they stole the code? 12 say? 13 MR. CHIN: I expect we will say that they stole the code. And I can imagine --14 15 THE COURT: Well, haven't you heard the 16 depositions? I mean, what -- seriously, what are they 17 going to say? Are they going to say "I stole it"? I'm 18 just curious. MR. CHIN: Well, I'm not quite sure they're 19 20 going to say in so many words. 21 But I think between that and the evidence 22 that's presented at trial, it will indicate that the code 23 was stolen, likely by one of those three or a combination. THE COURT: All right. 24 25 MR. CHIN: Those three individuals who worked

for LenSx, and who also worked for Alcon Research, the new name, are software engineers.

Alcon took the position in prevailing on a common interest motion, that Goldstein and Vardin's primary duties involved writing source code for the LenSx system.

If there's some argument, for example, in opening or closing or implied through an expert witness, that, "Oh, those are just rogue employees who happened to be writing software. We, Alcon Research, wouldn't have done or authorized such a thing," that would directly violate the case law on when an employee's knowledge would be imputable to the company.

THE COURT: But that's a legal question and part of the instruction. And if they make an argument that doesn't comport with the law, they're going to look horrible in front of the jury. I'm going to correct them.

MR. CHIN: Well, that does give me some comfort. But I suggest that we could nip the issue in the bud by --

THE COURT: When you say "nip it in the bud," see, I don't think you can because they're not willing to agree that they're going to make an argument that violates those principles of law.

But let me quickly hear from them. I just

1 don't see this as an issue. 2 MR. CHIN: Okay. 3 MS. HEFFERNAN: Your Honor is correct. 4 And, in fact, the parties both have jury 5 instructions on that legal issue. And so it's going to go 6 to the jury. Your Honor is going to instruct the jury. 7 And if Your Honor feels at some point it needs to -- the 8 Court needs to make a curative instruction regarding the 9 law, then we'll cross that bridge when we get there. 10 don't think we will get there. 11 The primary reason Alcon is opposing this motion is because knowledge is quintessentially a fact 12 13 issue, and who knew what and when and by whom they were 14 employed. And the legal imputation, I guess, or 15 imputability of that knowledge, those are quintessentially 16 fact issues that are for the jury. 17 And this motion --THE COURT: All right. I'm going to deny the 18 19 motion. 20 MS. HEFFERNAN: Okay. 21 THE COURT: Let's go. Next motion. 22 MS. HEFFERNAN: Okay. 23 THE COURT: And we'll fix this with jury 24 instructions. I just don't think this is an issue. 25

Next motion.

Your Honor, if you'd like to 1 MR. SAMMI: address plaintiffs' motion, MIL 2, physician choice. 2 3 THE COURT: Yep. 4 MR. SAMMI: Tony Sammi. Thank you, Your Honor. 5 THE COURT: Thank you. 6 MR. SAMMI: It's a pleasure to be before you. 7 I know we're pressed for time. I think that there's not 8 much of a dispute here. 9 THE COURT: That's what I think. 10 MR. SAMMI: And I think there's those carve 11 outs that Alcon wants that are unnecessary. We just want to make sure that no argument is presented that a verdict 12 13 for J&J would impact, you know, the marketplace or the folks. 14 15 THE COURT: They said they're not going to make 16 that argument. 17 Are you sticking to that representation? 18 MR. LOCASCIO: Yes. 19 MS. HEDGES: Yes, Your Honor. 20 MR. SAMMI: Ms. Hedges is going to argue it, 21 but we are --22 MS. HEDGES: Yes, Your Honor. 23 THE COURT: Yep? Okay. 24 What else? 25 MR. SAMMI: That's it.

1 THE COURT: I think just -- you want to say 2 something? Go ahead. Come up. 3 MS. HEDGES: Quickly, Your Honor. Yes. We 4 just want to make sure that -- first of all, that we can 5 still argue to Your Honor with regard to equitable 6 issues --7 THE COURT: Yes, can you. 8 MS. HEDGES: -- that there could be an impact. 9 All right. And we also want to make sure that we can argue about things like patient or physician 10 11 preference, which are relevant to things like lost 12 profits. 13 **THE COURT:** And they agree with that, correct? 14 MR. SAMMI: Your Honor, yes, patient and 15 physician preference is fine so long as it doesn't go to the ultimate -- you know, it doesn't leave the impression 16 17 with the jury that --18 THE COURT: Well, leave the impression. I 19 mean, look, I don't know what -- they're going to be left 20 with whatever they are. That's the whole -- that's what 21 trial lawyers do. 22 MR. SAMMI: You're right, Your Honor. 23 sorry. I misspoke. 24 I meant to the point that it's prejudicial; 25 meaning, that it is --

THE COURT: Okay. Well, then you can object at 1 2 the trial. We'll see. 3 MR. SAMMI: We will do that. 4 THE COURT: But again, I don't think this is an 5 issue. 6 Okay. So motion is denied as moot. 7 Next. 8 MR. MORIN: I think in terms of the plaintiffs' 9 motion, it's the contents of the privileged communications 10 issue. 11 THE COURT: Right. MR. MORIN: So Your Honor has indicated, in no 12 13 uncertain terms, that there will be at least discussion in 14 disgorgement portion, that they'll be allowed to talk 15 about the alleged delay and bringing suit. 16 THE COURT: Yes. 17 MR. MORIN: But --18 THE COURT: Well, why not, also, just 19 mitigating damages? 20 MR. MORIN: Well, there's two issues on the 21 mitigation of damages front. 22 The first is, I think we all agree that -- and 23 this was part of a different motion. But I think we all 24 agree -- I think it's Motion 4 -- that on actual damages, 25 which is all mitigation is relevant to, is actual damages.

THE COURT: 1 Right. MR. MORIN: On actual damages, laches is out in 2 view of Petrella. And we think mitigation would be just 3 4 another way of saying the laches --5 THE COURT: Now, wait, wait, wait, wait. 6 MR. MORIN: Yes, Your Honor. 7 THE COURT: First rule, it says -- in Petrella, is: You can't use laches to preclude a damages claim. 8 9 Where does Petrella say anything about mitigating damages? 10 11 MR. MORIN: This was Sy's motion. May I, Your Honor? 12 THE COURT: 13 Sure. MR. DAMLE: Your Honor, the fundamental 14 15 principle in Petrella was that, where Congress has set out 16 a statue of limitations, it has set forth the consequences 17 of delay. That's the principle. And that was picked up 18 in SCA Hygiene, the patent case, to say it's separation of 19 powers principle, when Congress has said these are the 20 consequences of delay through a statute of limitations. 21 It is a separation of powers problem for a 22 Court to impose an additional consequence for that delay 23 on top of what Congress has indicated to be the

consequence of delay. That's the fundamental principle

from both Petrella and SCA Hygiene.

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The mitigation defense that they have is 1 entirely based, entirely based on JJSV's delay in bringing 2 3 its lawsuit. That they have no other basis for their 4 mitigation claim. 5 And so given the nature -- so we're not saying 6 there couldn't be some possible mitigation type of 7 argument. Their mitigation claim is one that's based 8 solely on our delay in bringing suit. And that claim is 9 barred by both -- that defense, that flavor of defense, is 10 barred both by Petrella and by SCA Hygiene. 11 THE COURT: Okay. Anything else? We moved to 12 four. What happened to three? 13 MR. MORIN: There was a subsidiary issue on the mitigation question that related to four. 14 15 THE COURT: Oh, okay. 16 MR. MORIN: So back to three, Your Honor. 17 sorry to play musical chairs --18 THE COURT: No problem. 19 MR. MORIN: -- but Mr. Damle knows more --20 THE COURT: And incidentally -- so... 21 Go ahead. Let's do Number 3. 22 MR. MORIN: Sure. 23 And so the only issue with Number 3 that I

And so the only issue with Number 3 that I
think we're left with is the idea that -- they want to
bring up that lawyers were involved, for whatever reason,

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in the investigation.

And we've already had Judge Hall look at everything, say they have all the facts, and say -- and we should be able to take the privilege without being -- there being some suggestion as to what the lawyers' involvement may or may not have meant.

There's a 403 issue. It's not probative to anything.

THE COURT: I just want to make sure, that's what the question is, 403, right?

MR. MORIN: Yeah, that's correct, Your Honor.
Yes, that's it.

THE COURT: Yeah. I'm going to deny the motion in limine. I don't think it's unfairly prejudicial to say there were lawyers involved. I think, probably, there's an assumption there would be. I don't think you're prejudiced that way.

Now, if they went further and made a suggestion that, you know, that would require you to invoke the privilege, I mean, that would be a different issue --

MR. MORIN: Right.

THE COURT: -- you know, depending on how the question were phrased. But if they just mention in passing, I think it will be of no consequence.

MR. MORIN: We would -- I understand, Your

1 Honor. If they were to invoke, I would ask this favor. 2 3 If -- asking favors. 4 If they were to invoke a question that 5 reasonably would calls for the privilege, I would ask that 6 they bring it, and we discuss it outside the presence of 7 jury. If they were planning to invoke a question that 8 could call for the privilege, we would reasonably call for 9 insertion of the privilege. 10 THE COURT: That's just such a vague -- I 11 think, look, we've got able trial lawyers. 12 The question comes out, you can frame an 13 objection. If we have to, we'll go to sidebar, we'll hash 14 it out. 15 MR. MORIN: Okay. Thank you, Your Honor. 16 THE COURT: All right. So that dispenses --17 Number 3 is denied as moot. 18 Then we get to Number 4, which is mitigation --19 MR. LOCASCIO: Let me ask --20 THE COURT: Yeah. Go ahead. 21 MR. LOCASCIO: You said, "denied as moot." 22 THE COURT: Well --23 MR. LOCASCIO: It's not moot. You said that 24 this information comes in. 25 Their argument was, it has no relevance to

anything and shouldn't be --1 2 THE COURT: They filed a motion in limine to 3 preclude you from doing it, and I've denied it as moot. 4 You won. 5 MR. LOCASCIO: I'll take the denial. 6 When you said "denied as moot," typically, my 7 understanding is that means, like, we've all agreed it's 8 not an issue. 9 And I don't -- for instance, patient two -- or 10 Motion in Limine 2 was, like, okay, they don't want 11 something, we agree we're not going to do the something, 12 we --13 THE COURT: Oh, okay. I'll just deny it. 14 Sorry. 15 It's denied without prejudice to raise at trial 16 objections to questions that plaintiffs believe would 17 require invocation of the privilege. 18 MR. LOCASCIO: With any MIL, as I understood 19 it, Your Honor, if somebody does something, you could 20 obviously reraise it if it became so prejudicial. 21 THE COURT: Yep. All right. Fair enough. 22 Thank you for the clarification. 23 MR. DAMLE: Thank you, Your Honor. 24 If I could be heard on the rest of MIL 4. 25 THE COURT: Now, we're at Number 4, mitigation.

All right. Hold on. That's going to take a little bit of time. Let me just think.

Actually, what we will do is we'll call it a day. We'll resume with the rest of the motions in limine on February 6th.

Sorry. I'm just pulling up the calendar here to give you a time.

Let's do it at 1:00.

Okay. Then jury selection, I recommend we -- let's do it the 10th. All right? We'll have the jury brought in the 10th.

MR. MORIN: Great, Your Honor.

THE COURT: And we'll pick them. I'm sorry, you're probably going to be here the weekend anyway, you out-of-town folks, so -- right? And it just makes things move and then we'll start right at 8:30 on the 13th.

MR. MORIN: That sounds fine.

And we'll try to work with our friends to —
there are — not many disputes on the preliminary jury
instructions, but maybe Your Honor, on Friday if
there's — after we pick the jury, if there's anything
left, we could —

THE COURT: We might, frankly, be able to take care of that on the 6th. I've got the afternoon -- I'm sorry?

MR. LOCASCIO: I was curious of the same 1 question. If we want to have first round charge 2 conference, is the -- we plan to do it on the 6th if we 3 4 can get to it, or the 10th. 5 THE COURT: Correct. So basically, I'm giving 6 you the entire afternoon of the 6th. 7 MR. LOCASCIO: Okay. THE COURT: Okay. To see if we can get cleared 8 9 as many issues as we possibly can. 10 MR. MORIN: Just so I know what to be ready 11 for, though, what I -- is Your Honor's preference, in terms of the jury instructions, only to address the 12 13 preliminary instructions then, because we're going to see how things shape out and do a charge conference later for 14 15 the final instructions? 16 I just want to know what we should be prepared 17 to address on this --18 THE COURT: You've got a huge team. I would be 19 prepared for everything. Because if I can get to it, 20 let's take advantage of the time. 21 MR. LOCASCIO: And I would say -- the reason I 22 also suggested the 10th, there are a handful of issues. 23 For instance, the open disgorgement question. But even 24 like willfulness and some of these other issues,

deductions and whether that's in or out, that -- how we

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1 open the case, I don't think -- as much as we can get done 2 on the charge before openings, will serve us all a world 3 of good if we can do it. 4 THE COURT: Right. There's no request to stage 5 this thing. I mean, you don't want to stage damages, 6 willfulness until after infringement? 7 MR. LOCASCIO: We've not requested it to be akin to be, sort of, bifurcated. 8 9 Give us -- we'll talk about that and come back on the 6th. If somebody -- if we collectively think, or 10 11 one of us really strongly thinks it makes sense. THE COURT: I mean, I've got to tell you, I'm 12 13 not -- I mean, I'm normally very receptive to those 14 requests. In this case, at least it's the little I 15 understand on the facts, I mean --16 MR. MORIN: I think it's a damages case, 17 Your Honor. 18 THE COURT: Yeah. I mean, the guy stole the 19 stuff. I mean, unless that's really going to be disputed. 20 Now, maybe you are. 21 I don't know what the facts are, but I never 22 heard any vigorous defense saying, no, those guys didn't 23 steal the source code. It's more like how much of the

code was stolen, how much of that code that was stolen is

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in our code.

I mean, those are the things that I'm sensing. But anyway, you can all correct me if I'm wrong on February 6.

MR. MORIN: One other thing we can -Your Honor, if we can get guidance on or before
February 6, I'm holding out hope that you're going to
conclude that disgorgement is for the jury. But you
indicated -- I'm a realist. I want to listen to the
Court.

THE COURT: Right.

MR. MORIN: You've indicated there's some possibility that may not happen.

It would be helpful for us to know, for witnesses and the order of presentation of things, what that might mean. You know, the overlapping evidence gets presented. Do you want to do it after we excuse the jury each day? Is it a separate phase? Sometime later in time?

I'm hoping I'm asking a moot questions because you're at least going to do the advisory verdict, which is what their lead case did. But -- but, Your Honor -- and so that we don't have to retry it when the Federal Circuit

1 agrees with me. But if you don't go that route, in that small 2 3 chance you don't go that route, it would be helpful to 4 know for logistics purposes and I think for our friends 5 also. 6 THE COURT: I'm going to try what I can. I've 7 got a two-day trial. 8 Yeah. I'm going to try to get, you know, some 9 decision on the disgorgement when I can. All right. 10 MR. MORIN: All right. And if that -- not to 11 beg. And if that decision could also give some guidance on the procedural ramifications. 12 13 THE COURT: Oh, yes. Is it going to be a month later? 14 MR. MORIN: 15 Is it going to be in the evenings? Is it going to be --16 THE COURT: No. It's not going to be a month 17 later. 18 MR. MORIN: Okay. Great. THE COURT: It's going to be either in the 19 20 evenings or it's going to be right after the jury trial. 21 MR. MORIN: Got it. 22 MR. LOCASCIO: And I actually don't know -- I 23 think there's some issues that we can talk about then, but

it's not going to be another four-day event. It's going

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to be quick.

THE COURT: Okay. And just to remind you, the 1 first week of trial we're only going four days. 2 3 MR. MORIN: Correct, Your Honor. 4 THE COURT: Right. Okay. And then we have a 5 long weekend, because it's a holiday. And then we resume. 6 MR. MORIN: Right. And I think you said you 7 needed to be done by that Thursday --8 THE COURT: Yes. 9 MR. MORIN: -- is what we're factoring in. 10 You're not available that Friday. 11 THE COURT: Correct. MR. MORIN: So I think what both sides are 12 13 figuring, is four days the first day, and up to three days 14 the second -- second week. Sorry. 15 THE COURT: Yeah. Hold on. 16 MR. LOCASCIO: I thought it was just -- I 17 thought we only had the Tuesday of the second week. I 18 thought it was four days in week one. 19 THE COURT: Well, I've got written you've got 20 16 hours per side, which seems long, but... 21 MR. MORIN: Well, it's -- we're trying to get 22 there. 23 MR. LOCASCIO: Our spreadsheets all have a lot 24 of red on them. 25 THE COURT: Hold up, hold up, hold up.

MR. MORIN: You did say you had to be done by that Thursday.

THE COURT: Well, yeah, but I'm -- let me see.

I might be able to actually help you.

So actually, we can probably spill over until Friday, the 24th, through noon. In other words, I've got -- you know, we should still try to get this done in 16 hours. But if you're telling me there's no way to do it, I will listen.

MR. LOCASCIO: We'll look at our time, and we'll talk about that. Because we have operated, until this very moment, from that moment of the transcript was, you had to be done by Thursday of the first week; meaning, you couldn't be there Friday. That's fine. We have a difference of opinion on this.

And then we recalled you saying Tuesday. I have in my notes, like, we're going to close this case on Tuesday.

And then if the jury had to deliberate into Wednesday, so be it. If we could have more time and it's useful and we're not just going to, like everything, stretch to the --

THE COURT: Now, I am worried about that because it seems to me -- so I'll tell you what, come in very, very prepared on February 6th to walk through what

1 your trial is. 2 Who are your witnesses? 3 What are they going to say? 4 How long do you anticipate they will be? 5 Both of you do that. And then I'll see. 6 I'll tell you I've got a little more 7 flexibility. If I think you need more time, I'll give it 8 Right now, we had set 16 hours a side. That's 9 what you should plan on, you know. We'll discuss it on 10 February 6th. 11 MR. LOCASCIO: We certainly appreciate, to the 12 extent you think the parties need more time. I'll expect 13 we will happily take it. The pretrial order and 14 everybody's expectations was 16 a side, which gets you, at 15 most, to the Tuesday of the second week. 16 THE COURT: Yep. Right. 17 MR. MORIN: Yeah. And I don't want to disagree 18 with my friend. Your Honor had said until Thursday, so 19 we've kind of planned that way, although the hours 20 predominate -- the hours predominate.

And -- but we could use a little bit more time, and it won't be wasted time. We're having a hard time.

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We have -- what happens, Your Honor, as I'm sure you're familiar with, you can cut down direct when you have live witnesses. We have a bunch of former

employees where the -- so even the deposition testimony, 1 we cut and we cut and we cut, and we still have more hours 2 3 of it than I'd like. I don't want the jury to watch a lot. But they are the operative people, right? 4 5 And the depositions are never as constrained as what we could do if we had direct examinations, right? 6 7 So we're in a situation where we would love 8 20 hours if we can get it, and we won't waste the Court's 9 time. 10 THE COURT: All right. Well, yeah, we'll see. 11 Okay. 12 Be prepared on Monday, the 6th, to walk me 13 through all that. Okay. 14 MR. MORIN: Thank you, Your Honor, for your 15 time. 16 MR. LOCASCIO: Thank you, Your Honor. 17 (The proceedings concluded at 5:15 p.m.) 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25

CERTIFICATE OF COURT REPORTER

I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and accurate transcript from my stenographic notes in the proceeding.

/s/ Bonnie R. Archer
Bonnie R. Archer
Official Court Reporter
U.S. District Court

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